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I. INTRODUCTION
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,' the Supreme Court adopted a
new standard of factual particularity a plaintiff must meet to satisfy the
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) that a complaint
plead a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief."2 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 the Court made clear that the
Twombly pleading standard extended to civil actions seeking redress for
deprivation of constitutional rights in particular, and universally to all
Complaints filed in federal court. Commentators have debated whether
1. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
3. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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after Iqbal, victims of constitutional wrongdoing will be able to survive a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss where the government and its officials
exclusively harbor knowledge of the facts that animated the deprivation.4
Where constitutionality turns on the government's motive or justification
for its actions, how can the plaintiff assert factual allegations sufficient to
"nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible?"5
A second, less-discussed aspect of Iqbal is not new at all. Rather,
Iqbal is but the latest instance in a long line of cases in which the
Supreme Court, acting sua sponte, legislates a doctrine freeing
government and its officials from accountability for proven violations of
the Constitution. The Iqbal Court held that a supervisory official who is
aware of, and deliberately indifferent to, the unconstitutional conduct of
subordinates is not liable for damages caused by the deprivation. Rather,
plaintiff must prove the supervisor independently violated the
Constitution. Notably, Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director
Mueller never argued before either the district court or court of appeals
that plaintiff must prove a heightened level of culpability to establish
their liability for infringements of constitutional rights physically
inflicted by public employees under their command. Likewise, Ashcroft
and Mueller did not ask the Supreme Court to revise the law of
supervisory liability by elevating the requirements of plaintiffs prima
facie case.
The Iqbal Court's abandonment of well-entrenched limits on
judicial authority in order to unilaterally shelter the government from
4. See Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights
Litigation, 14 LEWIS AND CLARK L. REv. 157 (2010) (arguing plaintiffs in civil rights
cases may have difficulty pleading factually plausible claims where constitutionality
turns on defendant officials' subjective state of mind or evidence of government conduct
that took place outside public purview); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy
Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of lqbal on
Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS AND CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010) (contending Twombly and
Iqbal will make it difficult to plead factually plausible claims of intentional
discrimination because of informational inequities between parties); A. Benjamin
Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS AND CLARK L.
REv. 185, 200 (2010) (noting Iqbal makes it difficult for victims of discrimination to
state a claim where they do not have access to facts necessary to sustain plausibility);
Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS AND CLARK L.
REv. 43, 52 (2010) (noting information asymmetry makes it particularly difficult to plead
plausible claim for violation of civil rights and discrimination); Ray Worthy Campbell,
Getting a Clue: Two Stage Pleading as a Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114
PENN ST. L. REv. 1191 (2010) (noting information asymmetries may stand in the way of
plaintiffis ability to satisfy Iqbal pleading standard even for meritorious claims).
5. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. As Professor Brown details in his contribution to this
Symposium, Iqbal also expands the circumstances in which courts of appeal, on
interlocutory review, will reverse district court rulings that deny defendants' motion to
dismiss. Mark R. Brown, Qualified Immunity and Interlocutory Fact-Finding in the
Courts ofAppeals, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1317 (2010).
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accountability to persons deprived of their constitutional rights is not an
aberration. This article will examine the Court's penchant, without the
benefit of the views of the lower courts and advocates, to excuse
government entities and public officials from paying damages for
injuries caused by their constitutional wrongdoing. As a result of the
Court's judicial legislation, the innocent citizen is often left to bear the
losses caused by the government's invasion of the most fundamental
rights, those secured by the United States Constitution.
II. THE SUPREME COURT HAS SUBSCRIBED TO FOUR LIMITATIONS ON
ITS ROLE AND POWER
The reference to the Supreme Court's "legislative agenda" in the
title of this article ought to be a misnomer. For the Supreme Court has
categorically endorsed four limitations on its role and power designed to
ensure the Court does not inappropriately behave as a legislature.
A. Where the Issue Before the Court is Governed by a Valid Federal
Statute, the Court's Lone Role is to Interpret the Intent of the
Congress that Enacted the Statute
The Supreme Court has taken pains not to tread upon the power of
the legislature enumerated by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
The Court will adjudge whether Congress has acted within its prescribed
authority, and will not hesitate to void a statute Congress was not
empowered to enact.6 Where Congress has the power to promulgate
legislation, however, the Court's lone role is to faithfully interpret the
intent of the Congress that enacted the statute. Even where sympathetic
to the policy arguments raised by a litigant, the Court will not depart
from the contrary intent of the legislature expressed by the language of
the statute.7 Deference to the prerogative of the legislature also has led
the Court to pay special respect to precedent when resolving issues
regarding the intent of Congress. The Court has admonished that
"considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory
construction, where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation
of its legislation." 8
6. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding Congress
lacked the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act).
7. See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 222 (2009) (rejecting the argument that
the Prison Litigation Rights Act requires total exhaustion of administrative remedies);
Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920-23 (1984) (denying immunity to public defenders
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
8. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
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B. Absent Extraordinary Circumstances, the Court will Decline to
Address Issues Not Presented to the Lower Courts
Except in the rare instances where it sits as a court of original
jurisdiction,9 the Supreme Court acts solely as a court of review. In that
capacity, the Court ordinarily will address only issues that were
advanced before the trial court and court of appeals.' 0 By deeming a
claim or argument forfeited unless lodged with the district court, and
raised again before the court of appeals, the Court cultivates respect for
the lower courts, promotes judicial efficiency, reaches sound decisions,
and ensures fairness to the litigants." As the Court explained in Hormel
v. Helvering, requiring the party to advocate its claim before the inferior
courts,
is essential in order that the parties may have the opportunity to offer
all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues which the trial
tribunal is alone competent to decide; it is equally essential in order
that the litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decisions
there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce
evidence. 12
The Court will depart from the preservation requirement only in
"exceptional cases"' 3 where "the obvious result would be a plain
miscarriage of justice',14 or where "the proper resolution is beyond any
doubt.""
9. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 ("In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction.").
10. See e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 168-69 (2004);
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 n.2 (1989);
Prudential Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Flanigan, 478 U.S. 1311 (1986) (denying
application for writ of injunction raising constitutional issues that had not been presented
to the state's highest court until a petition for rehearing); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson,
326 U.S. 120, 128 (1945); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) ("No
procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that ... a right may be forfeited in
criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it."); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556
(1941). See also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit
like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual
expediency.").
11. See Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2009).
12. Honnel, 312 U.S. at 556.
13. Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976); Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557.
14. Hormel, 312 U.S. at 558. See also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n., 527 U.S. 526,
540 (1999); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 579, 535 (1992). But see Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) ("The matter of what questions may be taken up and
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Like other courts of appeal, the Supreme Court will adjudge issues
that were not presented or preserved below to remedy "plain error." The
plain error doctrine first was recognized judicially. In Wiborg v. United
States,16 Chief Justice Fuller wrote, "if a plain error was committed in a
matter so absolutely vital to defendants, we feel ourselves at liberty to
correct it," even where the defendant had not "duly excepted" to the error
at trial.17 The Supreme Court and United States Congress subsequently
approved a rule codifying the plain error doctrine for criminal cases.
Federal rule of criminal procedure fifty-two provides, "[a] plain error or
defect that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it
was not brought to the court's attention." 8
The Supreme Court has rigorously circumscribed the conditions
under which appellate courts may invoke the plain error doctrine to
review issues not raised and preserved below. Addressing arguments
presented for the first time on appeal is a "limited power"9 confined to
"particularly egregious errors," and should be done "sparingly, solely in
those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result."2 0  Claims newly presented on appeal may be considered only
where the party seeking review satisfies the "difficult" burden of meeting
resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of
appeals, to be exercised on the facts of the individual cases.").
15. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962). See Robert J. Martineau,
Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 1023, 1034-61 (1987) (critiquing the inconsistent and unprincipled basis on which
courts elect to decide issues raised for the first time on appeal).
16. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632 (1896).
17. Id. at 658-59. See also United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (in
"exceptional situations, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts ... may, of their
own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious,
or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.").
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain no
global plain error rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 46 and 51 generally require a party to present an
objection, and the grounds for the objection, to the trial court. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)
precludes parties from seeking appellate review of rulings admitting evidence unless the
party made a timely objection at trial and the court was aware of the ground for the
objection. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2) similarly requires a party complaining on appeal of a
ruling excluding evidence to have made the substance of the evidence known to the trial
court. The lone exception to the preservation requirement is that reviewing courts may
take "notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to
the attention of the court." FED. R. Evio. 103(d).
19. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993)
20. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982). In United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985), the Court reiterated that the plain error doctrine was to be
invoked "sparingly," and that any "unwarranted extension" of Rule 52's "exacting
definition" would distort the Rule's "careful balancing of our need to encourage all trial
participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against our insistence
that obvious injustice be promptly redressed" (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163).
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all four prongs of the exception. 21 First, defendant must prove he did not
affirmatively waive the claimed error. Second, defendant must establish
the legal error was "clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable
dispute." 2 2 Defendants invoking the plain error doctrine bear the further
burden of proving that the error "must have affected the outcome of the
district court proceedings" and thus was patently prejudicial. 23 Finally,
even when a defendant proves the mistake necessarily affected his
conviction, the appellate court retains discretion whether to address the
issue presented for the first time on appeal.24 In exercising that
discretion, the court should resolve the newly-raised issue only if the
error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings."25 The Court has warned against "unwarranted
extension" of the plain error rule, and has admonished that "creation of
an unjustified exception to the Rule would be 'even less appropriate."' 26
C. The Supreme Court's Own Rules Limit the Court to Issues
Presented by the Parties
Even where an issue has been raised and preserved before the lower
courts, the Supreme Court will not address the argument unless the
litigants properly present the issue to the Court. Supreme court rule
fourteen provides, in pertinent part, "A petition for a writ of certiorari
shall contain ... [t]he questions presented for review... . Only the
questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be
considered by the Court." 27  Supreme court rule fifteen similarly
specifies that the party opposing certiorari waives "[alny objection to
consideration of a question presented below, if the objection does not go
to jurisdiction ... unless called to the Court's attention in the brief in
opposition."28 Once the Court grants certiorari, the petitioner's brief may
21. Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009); Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.
22. Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1429.
23. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. The Court acknowledged there may be structural errors
that could be reviewed absent any proof that they affected the outcome, as well as errors
that may be presumed prejudicial, but declined to address either category. Id. The
independent requirement that an error be prejudicial to justify reversal of a lower court
judgment also is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2111, FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a), and FED. R. Civ. P.
61.
24. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.
25. Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1435 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732).
26. Id. at 1435 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997)).
27. SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(a). See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S.
175, 177 (1938). Supreme Court Rule 15 similarly provides that the party opposing
certiorari waives "[a]ny objection to consideration of a question presented based on what
occurred in the proceedings below, if the objection does not go to jurisdiction ... unless
called to the Court's attention in the brief in opposition." SUP. CT. R. 15(2).
28. SUP. CT. R. 15(2).
13392010]1
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
not raise additional questions or change the substance of the questions
presented in the petition for certiorari.2 9 Nor can the parties expand the
issues during their oral argument; instead, oral advocacy is limited to
"emphasiz[ing] and clarify[ing] the written arguments in the briefs on the
merits."3 o
The Court may decide matters not included in the questions
presented only if they rise to "plain error."3 1  Like the doctrine
precluding review of issues not preserved below, the rules limiting the
Court to consideration of issues presented for review by the petition for
writ of certiorari are "more than a precatory admonition," to be
disregarded only in the "most exceptional cases."3 2 The Supreme Court
generally has declared any issue not both presented to the lower courts
and raised by the petition for certiorari to be forfeited. The Court has
been loathe to depart from this restraint, announcing that even "the
29. SUP. CT. R. 24.1(a).
30. SUP. CT. R. 28.1.
31. SUP. CT. R. 24(1)(a). If the Court wishes to entertain an issue that the parties did
not raise in their petition or briefs, the Court may instruct the parties to file supplemental
briefs on the issue. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009)
(restoring the case to the Court's calendar for re-argument and directing parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing issue posed by the Court); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473 (2000); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 528 U.S. 1044 (1999); Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 527 U.S. 1033 (1999); Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 513
U.S. 958 (1994); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 512 U.S. 1280 (1994); Allied-Signal, Inc. v.
Dir., Div. of Taxation, 503 U.S. 928 (1992); Doggett v. United States, 502 U.S. 976
(1991); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Some Justices have viewed seeking supplemental briefing preferable to the Court
deciding an issue without benefit of the views of counsel. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87,
92 (1997) ("We do not say that a court must always ask for further briefing when it
disposes of a case on a basis not previously argued. But often, as here, that somewhat
longer (and often fairer) way 'round is the shortest way home."). Other Justices have
argued the Court should not use supplemental briefing as a means to rescue issues
forfeited by the parties. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876,
931 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This procedure is unusual and inadvisable for a
court."); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 623 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("As I have said before, 'the adversary process functions most effectively
when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion
the questions for review."').
32. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabarshiki Kaisha v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 32
(1993).
33. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 205 (2001) ("In the ordinary course
we do not decide questions neither raised nor resolved below. As a general rule,
furthermore, we do not decide issues outside the questions presented by the petition for
certiorari"); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 444 (1944); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 558 (1941); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 399 (1996); McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430, 434 (1940); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp.v. W. Elec. Co.,
304 U.S. 175, 177 (1938) ("Our consideration of the case will be limited to the questions
specifically brought forward by the petition."); Blair v. Oesterlein Mach. Co., 275 U.S.
220, 225 (1927).
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importance of an issue should not distort the principles that control the
exercise of our jurisdiction."3 4  As then-Judge Scalia conceptualized,
"[t]he premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit
as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as
arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before
them."35
D. The Court has Strictly Construed Article III of the United States
Constitution to Refuse to Decide Issues Properly Preserved and
Presented
A fourth limitation on the power of the Court to legislate prevents
the Court from deciding an issue, even where the issue has been
preserved below and properly presented to the Court in the petition for
certiorari and brief on the merits. Article III of the Constitution confines
the judicial power to "cases and controversies. "36 The Court has strictly
construed Article III to preclude the Court from resolving an issue unless
a) the issue is actually presented by the facts of the case, and b) it is
necessary for the Court to decide the issue.
The Court deems vigorous advocacy by the litigants regarding
application of law to the actual facts of the case indispensable.
Accordingly, the Court refuses to decide matters "not pressed before the
Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges
precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary
argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing
conflicting and demanding interests."37 The Court has fiercely adhered
34. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001).
35. Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Quong Wing v.
Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1912) (Holmes, J.) ("It rests with counsel to take the
proper steps, and if they deliberately omit them, we do not feel called upon to institute
inquiries on our own account. Laws frequently are enforced which the court recognizes
as possibly or probably invalid if attacked by a different interest or in a different way.
Therefore, without prejudice to the question that we have suggested, when it shall be
raised, we must conclude that so far as the present case is concerned the judgment must
be affirmed.").
36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I provides: "The judicial power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizen of another
State;-between citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
37. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961) (emphasis added). The
Article III case or controversy language has given rise to the judicial self-limitation
doctrines of standing, mootness and ripeness. See Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
13412010]
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to the constitutional obligation to confine its decisions to issues that must
necessarily be resolved and actually presented by the facts of the case.
The Court has unreservedly admitted that "[n]o principle is more
fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government
than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual
cases or controversies." 3 8
The Supreme Court has exalted the Article III limitation on the
judicial power as the justification to deny equitable relief to persons who
have suffered deprivations of constitutional rights. The mere fact that a
citizen has been victimized by past unconstitutional governmental action
does not entitle her to an injunction designed to prevent public officials
from persisting in the wrongful conduct.3 9 In Rizzo v. Goode 4 0 a class
action on behalf of all minority citizens and all residents of Philadelphia,
the district court found plaintiffs had proven an "unacceptably high"
number of constitutional violations caused by line police officers,
violations likely to recur absent corrective action.41 Concluding existing
departmental procedures were inadequate, the trial judge directed City
officials to submit a comprehensive program for dealing effectively with
civilian complaints.42 The court of appeals affirmed, finding equitable
relief appropriate to prevent recurrence of police misconduct.
Expressing "serious doubts" whether the facts of the case painted a
viable Article III case or controversy, the Supreme Court reversed the
issuance of the injunction.43 The Court reasoned plaintiffs could not
establish "continuing, present adverse effects" from the lack of a proper
citizen complaint procedure.4 Plaintiffs had argued police officers
would continue to ignore constitutional norms because department
disciplinary procedures were impotent. The Court deemed this prospect
U.S. 332, 335 (2006). These doctrines are premised on the supposition that courts risk
making erroneous decisions without adverse parties with a concrete stake in the outcome
presenting their positions to the Court. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United
for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (The Article III requirement
that a party seeking relief have suffered actual injury redressable by the court "tends to
assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a real
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.").
38. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)).
39. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).
40. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
41. Following twenty-one days of hearings in which 250 witnesses testified, the
district court made findings of fact concerning thirty-six separate incidents. The district
court ruled that plaintiffs had proven unconstitutional police misconduct in twenty of
those incidents. Id. at 373.
42. Id. at 365.
43. Id. at 371-72.
44. Id. at 372.
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too speculative to empower the courts to order measures designed to
prevent constitutional harm.
The Court further held Article III bars federal courts from enjoining
unconstitutional police actions even where plaintiff has a live claim for
damages arising out of the very conduct giving rise to equitable relief. In
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,4 5 two City of Los Angeles Police Officers
stopped Adolph Lyons for driving while one of his rear taillights was
burnt out. With revolvers drawn, the officers ordered Lyons to face his
car with hands clasped and placed on his head. After one of the officers
completed a pat-down search, Lyons lowered his hands. An officer then
slammed Lyons' hands back atop his head. When Lyons protested about
pain caused by the ring of keys he was holding, an officer placed Lyons'
in a chokehold. Lyons lost consciousness, fell face down to the ground,
urinated, defecated, and vomited blood and dirt.46 In some ways Lyons
was fortunate; Los Angeles Police officers had killed at least sixteen
persons by applying choke holds.4 7 The Department authorized its
officers to use holds against citizens even where they posed no threat of
violence to the officer.48
Lyons filed a Section 1983 action seeking damages, declaratory
relief, and an injunction to preclude officers from using choke holds.49
The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring choke holds
unless the citizen posed a threat of death or serious bodily harm. The
court of appeals affirmed.o
The Supreme Court reversed the injunction.51  The Court held
Lyons did not satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III
because Lyons could not establish he would have another confrontation
with the police that would result in application of a choke hold. The
purpose of Article III, the Court noted, was to "'assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues' necessary for the
proper resolution of constitutional questions."5 2 The parties certainly
would be motivated to vigorously advocate their position as to the
constitutionality of choke holds when litigating Lyon's claim for
damages. Nonetheless, the Court insisted the conjectural prospect that
Lyons would suffer future harm denied him constitutional standing to
procure injunctive relief.
45. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
46. Id. at 114 (Marshal, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 97.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 99-100.
51. Id. at 100.
52. Id. at 101 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
2010] 1343
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
The strength of the Court's insistence that an issue must necessarily
be presented by the facts of the case is perhaps best exemplified by the
Court's holding in Ashcroft v. Mattis.5 A police officer observed
Mattis's son climbing out an office window at a golf course. The son
had not used deadly force in the commission of the alleged burglary and
the officer did not reasonably believe that the son would use deadly force
if not immediately apprehended. Nevertheless, the officer shot and killed
Mattis's son when he failed to obey the officer's order to stop. A
Missouri statute allowed the use of deadly force to apprehend fleeing
persons suspected of felonies, even absent risk that the suspect had used
or would use such force. Because he was entitled to rely upon that
statute, the courts held the officer who shot Mattis's son immune from
liability for damages. However, the lower courts issued a declaratory
judgment proclaiming the Missouri statute violated the Constitution.5 4
Although it was the only remedy available for the alleged
constitutional violation, the Supreme Court reversed the declaration that
the state statute was unconstitutional. The Court ruled a federal judge
may issue a declaratory judgment only where there is a dispute that
"'calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis, but for an
adjudication of present right upon established facts."' 55 The Court held
Mattis's father's incentive to fully litigate the constitutionality of the
shooting to obtain emotional satisfaction from a determination that his
son's death was wrongful5 6 was insufficient to satisfy the "case or
controversy" requirement. In short, the Court abnegated power to
declare unconstitutional a state statute impermissibly authorizing deadly
force, even where the person killed has no other remedy. Mattis
demonstrates the robustness of the Court's understanding that it may not
and should not legislate. Instead, the Court's role is to decide only those
issues presented by the actual facts of the case, that necessarily must be
resolved.
Having detailed the limitations on the branch of government that
does not exercise legislative power, the article next examines the intent
of the Congress that exerted its prescribed power to provide a remedy to
persons deprived of rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.57
53. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977).
54. Id. at 172.
55. Id. at 172 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937)).
56. Even after his damage claim had been dismissed, Mattis had been before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit twice in quest of a declaration that
the statute authorizing the police shooting was unconstitutional. See id. at 171-72.
57. U.S. CoNsT., amend. XIV, § 5.
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III. CONGRESS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A BROAD REMEDY TO CITIZENS
DEPRIVED OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY STATE ACTORS
Save for the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment,58 the
United States Constitution does not prescribe a remedy for violation of
individual rights secured by the charter. In 1871, Congress enacted 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation
or usage of any State .. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights ...
secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in
any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. 59
The language of Section 1983 suggests Congress intended to afford
a broad remedy to citizens deprived of their constitutional liberty. The
terms of the statute are unqualified, imposing liability on "every person"
who, acting under color of state law,60 "subjects ... any citizen ... to the
deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution."6 1 Consistent
with the unequivocal words of the statute, the Supreme Court held
plaintiffs must prove only two elements to establish a prima facie case
under Section 1983: 1) defendant acted under color of state law, and
2) defendant's conduct caused plaintiff to be deprived of a right
protected by the Constitution.62
The legislative history of Section 1983 confirms Congress intended
the statute to generously afford relief to persons injured by officials who
58. "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST., amend. V.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
60. Section 1983 does not extend relief to persons whose rights were invaded by
federal, as opposed to state and local, officials. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court sanctioned a cause of
action for damages against individual federal officials who violated the Constitution. The
court has held liability of federal officials under Bivens should parallel the contours of
liability of state officials under Section 1983. "In the limited settings where Bivens does
apply, the implied cause of action is the 'federal analogy to suits brought against state
officials under . .. 42 U.S.C. § 1983."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009)
(quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006)); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 807 n.30 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
62. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding Section 1983 does not
require plaintiffs to prove culpability beyond that necessary to show a constitutional
violation); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) ("[T]he initial inquiry must focus
on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present."); Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635 (1980) (holding immunity is an affirmative defense to be pleaded by
defendants); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding plaintiffs need not prove
defendants acted willfully to prevail in Section 1983 action).
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violated the Constitution. Senator Edmunds, manager of the bill in the
Senate, stated the Act was "so very simple and really reenacting the
Constitution." Representative Bingham announced the purpose of the
bill to be "[t]he enforcement . .. of the Constitution on behalf of every
individual citizen of the Republic ... to the extent of the rights
guaranteed to him by the Constitution."" Representative Shellenberger
instructed that courts should interpret Section 1983 to favor relief to
victims of unconstitutional governmental action:
The Act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty
and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions
authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed ...
As has been again and again decided by your own Supreme Court of
the United States, and everywhere else where there is wise judicial
interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the words employed
is uniformly given in construing such statutes . . . as are meant to
protect and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the
people.65
Notwithstanding the absolute language of Section 1983 and the
legislative instruction to liberally construe the statute to provide a
remedy, the Supreme Court has extended increasingly expansive
immunity to individual public officials sued for damages under Section
1983. At the same time, the Court fully sheltered state governmental
entities from monetary liability and severely limited the circumstances
under which local governments are liable for harms inflicted by the
unconstitutional acts of their employees. As a consequence, the innocent
citizen is frequently left without compensation for injuries suffered at the
hands of government officials who violate the Constitution. As will next
be discussed, the Supreme Court crafted this scheme of risk allocation by
consistently ignoring the tenets that limit its power and role.
63. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Is Sess., 569 (1971) (cited in Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978)).
64. Opponents of the bill likewise cited its unbounded application:
It authorizes any persons who is deprived of any right ... secured to him by the
Constitution . .. to bring an action against the wrongdoer in the Federal Courts,
and without any limit whatsoever as to the amount in controversy ... there is
no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are employed, and they are as
comprehensive as can be used.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., I" Sess. App. 335-36, 216-17 (1871) (remarks of Sen.
Thurman) (cited in Monell, 436 U.S. at 686 n. 45 and in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 179-80).
65. Id. at 68 (cited in Monell, 436 U.S. at 684).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT SUA SPONTE EXPANDED QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY OF INDIVIDUAL STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS BEYOND
THE CIRCUMSTANCES INTENDED BY CONGRESS
The language of Section 1983 makes no mention of immunity.
However, the Supreme Court held the Congress that enacted the statute
in 1871 intended to incorporate then-existing common law immunities to
excuse individual state and local officials from liability for damages
caused by their violations of the federal constitution.6 6 Certain officials
who had blanket immunity at common law for performing the functions
of their job-notably legislators, judges and prosecutors-are absolutely
immune from damage liability under Section 1983 for these same
functions. Officers who at common law could assert a qualified
immunity could invoke that same immunity when sued under Section
1983.
As the origin of qualified immunity under Section 1983 is
Congress' intent to incorporate the immunity available at common law,
one would expect the test for Section 1983 immunity to remain tethered
to the common law immunity standard. By the Court's own reckoning,
under the common law, an official could avail himself of qualified
immunity only if he satisfied both an objective and subjective prong.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Supreme Court defined the immunity test as
follows:
In varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the
executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon
the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the actions
in which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief in light of all the circumstances,
coupled with good faith belief, which affords a basis for qualified
immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of
official conduct.68
In a trilogy of cases-Wood v. Strickland, Procunier v. Navarette
and Harlow v. Fitzgerald-the Court revamped the test for immunity the
Court had held prescribed by Congress. The Court vastly lowered the
bar an official must meet to avail himself of immunity, in turn increasing
the circumstances under which injured citizens are unable to recover
66. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
67. As Professor Pfander's contribution to this Symposium details, the Supreme
Court may have erred in presuming immunity was routinely available to government
officials at common law. See James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens and the Role of Judge-
Made Law in Constitutional Litigation, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1387 (2010).
68. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (emphasis added).
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damages from officials who violate the strictures of the Constitution. To
satisfy the objective prong of the immunity, the state official's belief in
the propriety of his conduct no longer need be reasonable in light of all
the circumstances; instead, even if a reasonable official would not have
believed his conduct appropriate, the official per se fulfills the objective
tier of immunity whenever the federal constitutional right violated was
not "clearly established." The Supreme Court was even more dramatic
in its revision of the subjective prong. The Court completely eliminated
the requirement that the officials must act in good faith to be immune.
Consequently, even malicious or intentional violations of the
Constitution are immunized whenever the right invaded was not clearly
established. Not only did the Court depart from the common law
immunity standard intended by the Congress that enacted Section 1983.
In each of the cases in the trilogy, the Court legislated a new immunity
standard that a) was not argued or acted on by the lower courts, b) was
not advocated by the parties before the Supreme Court, and c) was not
necessary to the decision as required by the case or controversy
requirement of Article III.
A. Wood v. Strickland
In Wood v. Strickland, the Court unilaterally invented the novel
concept of "clearly established rights" as a singularly relevant factor in
the objective tier of qualified immunity.6 9 In Wood, three high school
students filed an action for damages under Section 1983, alleging they
had been suspended from school without the due process required by the
Fourteenth Amendment. After the jury failed to reach a verdict, the
district court granted the individual school officials' motion for
judgment, ruling they were immune because they had acted in good faith
and without malice. 7 0 The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a
new trial, holding the district court had erred in applying a subjective test
for qualified immunity. Immunity, the court of appeals reasoned, was an
objective standard, with immunity forfeited if the officials did not act in
good faith under all the circumstances.7
The Supreme Court held that to be immune, the official must satisfy
both a subjective and an objective test. 72 In its initial exposition of the
objective tier of immunity, the Court quoted the test it had set forth in
Scheuer v. Rhodes, requiring the official seeking immunity to have
objectively reasonable grounds for the belief that his actions were
69. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
70. See Strickland & Crain v. Inlow, 348 F. Supp. 244, 250-54 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
71. See Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F. 2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1973).
72. See Wood, 420 U.S. at 321.
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constitutional "in light of all the circumstances." 7 3 The Court's policy
analysis was consistent with that definition of the test. The Court posited
it would be unfair and undesirable to make school board members pay
damages "for mistakes which were not unreasonable in the light of all
the circumstances" 74 and opined school board officials must be assured
they will not be punished for "action taken in the good-faith fulfillment
of their responsibilities and within the bounds of reason under all the
circumstances."7 5 In the final paragraph of its reasoning on immunity,
however, the Court for the first time interposed the clarity of the
constitutional right as a discrete element of immunity analysis:
The official himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he
is doing right, but an act can no more be justified by ignorance or
disregard of settled, indisputable law .. . than by the presence of
actual malice.... [A] school board member must be held to a
standard of conduct based not only on permissible intentions, but also
on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his
charges.... That is not to say that school board members are
'charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law.' A
compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school board
member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with
such disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional
rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in
good faith.76
As the dissent pointed out, the Court offered no authority for
departing from what it unambiguously had held in Scheuer to be the
common law standard for the objective prong intended by Congress
when it enacted Section 1983. The dissenters further believed the
concept of "settled, indisputable law" or "unquestioned constitutional
rights" to be cryptic and indecipherable by constitutional law scholars
and school board members alike.77 In what would prove ironic in light of
the Court's further redefinition of the objective tier one year later, the
dissent complained the new and unfounded test would deprive officials
of immunity whenever the right violated was clearly established. The
dissenters urged the objective tier continue to be governed by the
Scheuer test, satisfied only when the official's belief that his actions were
lawful is reasonable under all the circumstances.
73. Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 321-22 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 329.
78. See id. at 330.
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1. The Lower Court Opinions
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals addressed whether
the objective test for qualified immunity should be adjusted to render the
state of the law a signature element. Because the district court believed
immunity is governed by a purely subjective test of good-faith, it had no
occasion to consider whether to earmark the state of the law under the
objective prong. The court of appeals similarly did not assess whether to
modify the objective test to require courts to discern the clarity of the
right in issue. To the contrary, while holding that immunity is defined by
an objective rather than subjective standard, the court of appeals
reiterated the Scheuer test-the officials would be immune only if "in
light of all the circumstances, [they] act[ed] in good faith." 7 9 The court
of appeals then remanded the case to the district court for a new trial
against school board members under the Scheuer standard.
2. Arguments of the Parties Before the Supreme Court
Neither defendant school board officials nor plaintiff students asked
the Supreme Court to tweak the objective tier to condition immunity on
the state of the law. The question presented by the school board
officials' brief on immunity was:
Whether a public school board member is entitled to invoke the
doctrine of official or sovereign immunity in a student's civil rights
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so as to avoid individual and personal
financial liability except where the acts complained of were done
with malice.80
The officials' brief argued first that school board members were entitled
to absolute immunity from suits by students.8 ' Alternatively, the board
members argued that if they were entitled only to qualified immunity, the
students must prove the school board acted with actual malice to
overcome that immunity.82 At no time did defendants submit the Court
should redefine the Scheuer test for the objective prong to render the
state of the law uniquely relevant to immunity.83
79. Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F. 2d at 191.
80. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (No. 73-
1285).
81. See id. at 42.
82. See id. at 13 and 44-48.
83. During oral argument, the board members' counsel conceded Scheuer v. Rhodes
provided the governing standard for qualified immunity. Transcript of Oral Argument, at
11, Wood, 420 U.S. 308 (No. 73-1285). Counsel argued the school board members could
be immune under the Scheuer standard, as the district court's ruling on a motion for a
temporary restraining order had found "School Board members had reasonable grounds
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The plaintiff students likewise did not ask the Court to modify the
objective prong of immunity to isolate the clarity of the law as
determinative. Plaintiffs opposed absolute immunity and advocated for
an objective test, rather than a subjective "actual malice" test, to govern
qualified immunity. 84 Plaintiffs never contended that the state of the law
should inform the objective test. Instead, plaintiffs recited the litany of
factual deficiencies in the procedures leading to their suspensions to
demonstrate the school board members did not objectively act in good
faith."
3. The Supreme Court Opinion
Modifying the immunity standard was neither necessary to resolve
the issues, nor presented by the facts of the case, as required by the
Article III case and controversy requirement.86 The Supreme Court held
the school board members did not violate the substantive due process
rights of the students by suspending them;87 therefore there was no need
to address immunity on that claim. The Court remanded the case for
consideration of whether the officials violated the students' procedural
due process rights, an issue neither lower court had addressed.
Accordingly, a change to the Scheuer immunity standard was neither
presented by the facts nor necessary to the Court's decision as required
by the case or controversy requirement of Article 111.8
B. Procunier v. Navarette
The Wood dissenters had complained that the Court's interposition
of "clearly established rights" as a distinct factor in qualified immunity
to believe that their regulation had been violated." Id. At no juncture during argument
did defendants' counsel suggest there was an ambiguity in the law regarding due process
that should affect immunity analysis.
84. See Brief for Respondents at 42-43 Wood, 420 U.S. 308 (No. 73-1285).
85. See id. at 46 (The school board meeting "was obviously called too hastily,
conducted too summarily, coldly, impersonally, superficially, ineptly and brutally. If it
were not bad faith, it was certainly an adequate substitute."). At oral argument, plaintiffs'
counsel made no arguments concerning, and was asked no questions regarding,
immunity. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-30, Wood, 420 U.S. 308 (No. 73-
1285).
86. For the same reasons, rewriting immunity was not required to avoid prejudice to
the school board officials or to ensure the fairness of the proceedings under the plain
error exception to the preservation requirement.
87. See Wood, 420 U.S. at 326.
88. The Supreme Court did not suggest any ambiguity in the law pertaining to the
procedural due process aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment that would affect analysis of
immunity on remand. To the contrary, the Court noted, "Over the past 13 years the
Courts of Appeals have without exception held that procedural due process requirements
must be satisfied if a student is to be expelled." Wood, 420 U.S. at 324 n.15.
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analysis automatically denied immunity whenever the right was well
settled at the time of the violation. In Procunier v. Navarette,89 the Court
turned that understanding of the effect of the state of the law on its head.
The Procunier Court held where the right was clearly established,
the government official nonetheless could satisfy the objective tier of
immunity. The official would meet the objective tier if either a) he did
not know and should not have known of the right; or b) he did not know
and should not have known that his conduct violated the right.90 In short,
albeit violating clearly established constitutional rights, the official could
invoke the pre- Wood definition of the objective prong of immunity by
demonstrating his actions were reasonable under all the circumstances.
On the other hand, where the right violated was not clearly
established, the official automatically conforms to the objective prong of
the immunity defense; 91 the plaintiff is not permitted the additional two
bites of the apple afforded the official. Plaintiff cannot negate immunity
by proving a) the official knew or should have known of the right, or
b) knew or should have known that his conduct violated the right. In
sum, even where his conduct is unreasonable under all the circumstances,
the officer ineluctably meets the objective test for immunity whenever
the right is not clearly established.
As was true of its initial introduction of the state of the law as a
signature aspect of immunity, the Procunier Court's further departure
from the common law immunity standard legislated by Congress (a) was
achieved without the views of the lower courts, (b) was resolved without
the advocacy and input of counsel for the parties before the Court, and
(c) was not presented by the facts or necessary for resolution of the case.
1. The Lower Court Opinions
Navarette, an inmate at Soledad State prison, filed a Section 1983
damages claim against the Director of the California Department of
Corrections, the Warden and Assistant Warden of Soledad, and three
subordinate officers in charge of mail handling. Navarette alleged, in
pertinent part, that defendants had refused to mail letters Navarette
penned while incarcerated.92 Statewide regulations permitted prison
officials to bar mailings "that pertain to criminal activity; are lewd,
obscene, or defamatory; contain prison gossip or discussion of other
inmates; or are otherwise inappropriate."93  The same regulations
89. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
90. See id. at 562.
91. See id. at 565.
92. Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1976).
93. Procunier, 434 U.S. at 558 n.3.
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prohibited officials from interfering with correspondence between the
inmate and his attorney.94 Prison officials refused to send letters from
Navarette seeking legal assistance for a federal writ of habeas corpus and
for his instant Section 1983 action.95 Contrary to regulation, the warden
took the position that officials could confiscate any inmate mail,
including legal correspondence, "'if we don't feel it is right or
necessary."' 96
The first two counts of Navarette's complaint averred the officials
had deliberately refused to mail his letters in violation of both the Free
Speech and Due Process protections of the United States Constitution.97
The third count submitted line officials responsible for mailing letters
had invaded Navarette's First Amendment rights by negligently and
inadvertently misapplying the mail regulations, and supervisory officials
had negligently failed to provide adequate training and supervision to
their subordinates.9 8
Without issuing a written opinion, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the prison officials on all three counts. 99
The court of appeals reversed. 00 The court of appeals held Navarette's
allegation that officials had intentionally refused to mail Navarette's
correspondence stated a claim for violation of his First Amendment right
to free expression.' 0 ' On the matter of qualified immunity, the Court
found there was a dispute of material fact as to whether the officials had
a reasonable and good faith belief that their conduct was lawful and
complied with the prison regulations.10 2  The court also noted the
question of the officials' subjective good faith is classically an issue of
fact incapable of resolution on summary judgment.10 3
The court of appeals further reasoned the qualified immunity
defense is not extended globally to all public officials who may not
invoke absolute immunity.104  Rather, as the Supreme Court had
previously held, immunity under Section 1983 is derived from Congress'
intent to incorporate common law immunities that existed as of 1871
94. Id.
95. See id. at 565 n.12; Brief for Respondent at 2-3, 7 n.9, Procunier, 434 U.S. 555
(No. 76-446).
96. Procunier, 434 U.S. at 570.
97. Id. at 557-58.
98. Id. at 558.
99. See id. at 558.
100. Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F. 2d 277, 282 (9th Cir. 1976).
101. Id. at 279.
102. See id. at 280.
103. Navarette had submitted affidavits contradicting the officials' conclusory
contention that they had acted with the good faith belief they were abiding by prison mail
regulations. See id.
104. See id.
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when it enacted the legislation. 05 Hence, prison officials could assert
immunity only if there existed a common law tradition of immunity for
prison officers and such immunity is supported by public policy.'06
Accordingly, in addition to reversing the grant of summary judgment, the
court of appeals instructed the district court to determine whether the
prison officials were eligible to assert a qualified immunity defense at
trial.
The court of appeals similarly reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment on the negligence count. The court noted the
complaint properly pleaded a violation of Navarette's fundamental right
to free expression. Moreover, as a matter of statutory intent, Section
1983 does not require additional proof that the official purposefully
violated the right. Hence the officials could be liable for their negligent
violation of the Constitution. The dispute of fact as to the officials' good
faith belief that they had complied with prison regulations equally
mandated denial of summary judgment on immunity for the negligence
claim.107  At no point in its treatment of immunity did the court of
appeals either analyze whether the constitutional right was clearly
established at the time of the violation, or posit the implications for
immunity if the right were or were not settled. 08
2. Arguments of the Parties Before the Supreme Court
On its face, the prison officials' petition for a writ of certiorari did
not challenge the court of appeals' determinations that material fact
disputes precluded summary judgment on immunity. Rather, the
questions presented in the petition relevant to the mail claims were:
1. Whether negligent failure to mail certain of a prisoner's outgoing
letters states a cause of action under section 1983.
3. Whether deliberate refusal to mail certain of a prisoner's
correspondence in 1971-1972 prior to Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974) and refusal to send certain correspondence by
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 282. While not stated explicitly in this portion of its opinion, as with
the first two counts, the district court presumably would have to consider whether there
was an established background of common law immunity entitling prison officials to
assert any immunity under Section 1983.
108. In ruling that Section 1983 afforded a cause of action for negligent violations of
constitutional rights, the court of appeals noted in passing that "the prisoner's rights
which Navarette alleges to have been violated are fundamental and reasonably well-
defined." Id.
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registered mail states a cause of action for violation of his First
Amendment right to free expression.109
The Court's order granting certiorari was limited to the first
question. As later would become evident in Parratt v. Taylor 0 and
Daniels v. Williams,I' to decide if an allegation of negligence states a
cause of action under Section 1983, a court must ascertain a) whether
Congress intended to require plaintiffs to prove culpability, beyond a
constitutional violation, as a statutory element of the prima facie case,
and b) whether the constitutional right in issue is violated only by
conduct rising to a standard of culpability more egregious than
negligence.
However, in addressing whether Congress intended negligent
deprivations of constitutional rights to be redressed under Section 1983,
the briefs of both parties drew support for their respective positions by
analogizing to the Court's qualified immunity decisions.' 12 The parties
also debated whether the rights in issue were clearly established at the
time the prison officials declined to mail Navarette's letters." 3 Notably,
neither party argued whether Navarette or the prison officials could look
beyond the settled or unsettled nature of federal constitutional law in
advocating whether the state actors' belief in the propriety of their
conduct was reasonable under all the circumstances for purposes of
immunity.1 4 Nor did either party argue the merits of the decidedly pro-
109. Procunier, 434 U.S. at 858 n.6.
110. Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
111. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
112. See Brief for Petitioners at 12-13, Procunier, 434 U.S. 555 (No. 76-446) (noting
that the qualified immunity test in Pierson v. Ray and Wood v. Strickland indicate that
section 1983 was limited to intentional conduct); Brief for Respondent 20-27, Procunier,
434 U.S. 555 (No. 76-446); Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, 14-15, Procunier, 434 U.S. 555 (No. 760446)
(noting that qualified immunity cases reinforce liability for objectively unreasonable
constitutional invasions).
113. The prison officials argued a right is not clearly established until it is "first
articulated by [the Supreme] Court and then a reasonable period of time for dissemination
of this Court's ruling is permitted." Brief for Petitioners at 20, Procunier, 434 U.S. 555
(No. 76-446). Navarette submitted that beyond rulings of the Supreme Court, lower
federal and state court decisions should be consulted in determining whether the right
was clearly established, Brief for Respondent at 53, Procunier, 434 U.S. 555 (No. 76-
446), and that the relevant opinions should be applicable beyond their particular facts.
Brief for Respondent at 55, Procunier, 434 U.S. 555 (No. 76-446).
114. Navarette relied solely upon the state of the law to oppose immunity, arguing
decisions of the Supreme Court, lower federal courts and state courts "remove[ ] any
possibility that defendants herein could reasonably have believed valid any instances of
interference with plaintiff's outgoing mail ..... Brief for Respondent at 66, Procunier,
434 U.S. 555 (No. 76-446). Navarette did not further argue that even if the right was not
clearly established based upon decisional law, the officials' asserted failure to comply
with regulations governing censorship of inmate mail indicates they reasonably should
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defendant test ultimately legislated by the Court-a test that allows
government actors to offer evidence of the reasonableness of their belief
in the propriety of their actions when the right offended was clearly
established, but prohibits victims of constitutional wrongs from offering
comparable evidence of unreasonableness when the right was not settled.
3. The Supreme Court Opinion
Although the question on which certiorari was granted concerned
only whether Congress intended Section 1983 to redress negligent, as
opposed to intentional, violations of the Constitution, the Court
nonetheless chose to address qualified immunity. The majority viewed
immunity as a subsidiary issue "fairly comprised" by the question
presented, because the briefs of the parties had addressed whether the
officials should have known their conduct violated Navarette's
constitutional liberties." 5 In any event, the Court offered, its power to
decide cases is not constrained by the contours of the question
presented.116
Having chosen to embrace the immunity issue, the Court did not
take up the one aspect of immunity explicitly singled out for
consideration on remand by the court of appeals: whether prison
officials were in possession of any immunity at common law that could
in turn be raised as a defense in a Section 1983 action.' 17 Rather than
enforce Congress' intent to incorporate into Section 1983 only
immunities that prevailed at common law, the Court simply issued what
Justice Scalia later would confess to be a "policy prescription."" 8
have known of the right or that their conduct violated the right. The prison officers
likewise rested their argument entirely on the unsettled state of the law, and did not
submit that they could continue to press for immunity under the objective tier if the right
violated was clearly established. Brief for Petitioners at 19-21, Procunier, 434 U.S. 555
(No. 76-446).
115. Procunier, 434 U.S. at 559.
116. See id. at 858 n.6. Chief Justice Burger dissented, finding whether defendants
were immune was wholly different than, and not comprised within, the question whether
Section 1983 supplies a cause of action for negligent conduct. Chief Justice Burger
further noted the case did not fall within "any 'well-recognized exception' to our
practice" of considering only the question on which certiorari was granted. Id. at 566-67
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Procunier, 434
U.S. 555 (No. 76-446) ("Well, I thought, Counsel, that the Court, in narrowing the
question as it did, was trying to pass on what the Ninth Circuit said ... that state officers
negligently deprived him of those rights state a 1983 cause of action and that is the only
issue in this case .... ).
117. Neither party had addressed this issue in its briefs. Inexplicably, the Court
wrongly stated that "[t]he Court of Appeals appeared to agree that petitioners were
entitled to the claimed degree of immunity ..... Procunier, 434 U.S. at 560.
118. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 415-16 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The truth to tell, Procunier v. Navarette ... did not trouble itself with
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Without any assessment of immunity, if any, conferred upon prison
officials at common law, the Court dictated that prison officials sued
under Section 1983 could assert a qualified immunity defense.
While ignoring the one aspect of immunity actually addressed by
the court of appeals, the Court legislated a new standard for immunity
that was neither raised below nor advocated by either party before the
Court. Without intimating any departure from either Scheuer v. Rhodes
or Wood v. Strickland, the Court issued the single sentence that
dramatically re-engineered the test for the objective tier:
Under the first part of the Wood v. Strickland rule, the immunity
defense would be unavailing to [the prison officials] if the
constitutional right allegedly infringed by them was clearly
established at the time of their challenged conduct, if they knew or
should have known of that right, and if they knew or should have
known that their conduct violated the constitutional norm.119
Finding that First Amendment rights of prisoners were not clearly
established at the time the officials refused to send Navarette's legal
correspondence, the Court held that the officials had irrebuttably satisfied
the objective prong of the immunity. Under the Court's test, Navarette
was not entitled to defeat immunity by proving that under all the
circumstances-including the officials' contravention of statewide
regulation barring interference with an inmate's correspondence with
legal counsel-the officials should have known that refusing to send his
letters to legal assistance organizations would have violated his rights.12 0
Given that the Court had held Navarette's constitutional right was
not clearly established, the facts of the case did not present the question
of the availability of immunity where the right was settled. While not
necessary to the decision, the Court volunteered that if the right had been
clearly established, then the officials would have two additional bites at
satisfying the objective tier of the immunity.121 The Court issued its ipse
history ... but simply set forth a policy prescription"). Justice Stevens, dissenting in
Procunier, bemoaned the Court's failure to investigate the common law treatment of
prison officials and intimated that such officials may have been accorded no immunity at
common law. Justice Stevens further objected to the majority's failure to limit any
immunity to discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts. See Procunier, 434 U.S. at
568-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Pfander, supra note 67.
119. Procunier, 434 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added).
120. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) (holding officials do not lose
immunity because their conduct violates state statute or administrative regulation).
121. The Court's election to prescribe two additional means by which officials could
satisfy the objective prong of qualified immunity where the right is clearly established
was not necessary to prevent injustice on the intentional violation claims the court of
appeals had remanded to the district court. Material issues of fact precluded officials
from meeting the subjective good-faith requirement. Consequently, the claims of
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dixit in stark contrast to the Article III standards it applied to deny relief
to victims of unconstitutional conduct.
C. Harlow v. Fitzgerald
The Procunier Court's unilateral reformulation of the objective
prong immunizes public officials who infringe rights that were not
clearly established, even where the officials' conduct was unreasonable
under all the circumstances. The only instance in which such officials
would be held liable for damages is where they acted with actual malice,
and thus fail the subjective tier of the immunity. In Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, the Court abrogated the requirement that the official act must
be done in good faith to be exempted from liability for damages under
Section 1983.122 As with its rewriting of the objective tier of immunity
in Wood and Procunier, the Harlow Court's abolition of the subjective
tier a) was not passed upon by the lower courts, b) was not advocated by
the parties to the Court, and c) was not necessarily presented by the facts
of the case.12 3
1. The Lower Court Opinions
Fitzgerald, a civilian cost analyst in the Department of the Air
Force, contended he was fired after testifying before a congressional
intentional wrongdoing would proceed to trial regardless of whether the prison officials
fulfilled the objective half of the immunity test.
122. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
123. Because Harlow was an action against federal, rather than state, actors, the Court
was not interpreting Section 1983. However, the Court had ruled in Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits
brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." While noting the case
did not directly present the issue of immunity of state officials under Section 1983, the
Harlow Court then quoted the portion of its Butz opinion prescribing the immunity of
state and federal officials should not differ. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, n.30.
Four days after its Harlow opinion, the Court vacated and remanded a decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a Section 1983 action that had
rejected the qualified immunity defense of state parole officers. The Court's order
instructed the court of appeals to consider the case in light of Harlow, and again quoted
the portion of Butz dictating the equivalent immunity of state and federal officials.
Wolfel v. Sanbom, 458 U.S. 1102 (1982).
In Davis v. Scherer, 486 U.S. 183, 194 n.12 (1984), the Court applied the objective-
only immunity standard to Section 1983, noting that while Harlow was a suit against
federal officials, "our cases have recognized that the same qualified immunity rules apply
in suits against state officers under § 1983 and in suits against federal officials under
Bivens . . . ." Since then, the Court has unvaryingly applied the Harlow standard to
Section 1983 actions. See Gary S. Gildin, Immunizing Intentional Violations of
Constitutional Rights Through Judicial Legislation: The Extension of Harlow v.
Fitzgerald to Section 1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J. 369 (1989).
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committee about anticipated cost overruns on an Air Force plane.
Fitzgerald sought damages from senior Presidential aides and advisors
Harlow and Butterfield, asserting they had conspired to terminate
Fitzgerald's employ and to prevent his reinstatement in retaliation for
testifying before the committee.12 4  After six years of discovery,
defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds of both
absolute and qualified immunity.
The district court denied the motion for summary judgment. 12 5 The
court first ruled defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity for
actions taken in their capacity as senior aides and advisors to the
President.12 6  While agreeing that defendants were entitled to assert
qualified immunity, the court held fact issues precluded summary
judgment on that defense. The court reasoned issues of fact remained as
to three immunity related questions: 1) whether defendants had acted
within the bounds of their responsibilities, 2) whether any belief
defendants held about the legality of their actions was reasonable, and
thus satisfied the objective prong of immunity; and 3) whether
defendants acted without malicious intent to deprive Fitzgerald of his
rights, and consequently met the subjective test of the immunity
defense.12 7 The district court's opinion did not reflect any argument by
defendants that the subjective tier of the immunity be eliminated or
modified.
Defendants immediately appealed denial of their motion for
summary judgment. Fitzgerald filed a motion to dismiss the appeal,
arguing that as the district court's denial was not a final order, it was not
appealable. Without issuing an opinion, the court of appeals granted
Fitzgerald's motion to dismiss the appeal, and denied motions for
rehearing and rehearing en banc.128 Obviously, the court of appeals did
not address whether to dissolve the subjective requirement of the
qualified immunity test. Harlow and Butterfield then sought review by
the Supreme Court.
124. Fitzgerald also sued President Nixon. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731
(1982), the Court held Nixon was entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability
for all acts within the outer perimeter of the President's official responsibility.
125. The district court's March 26, 1980 Order denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment is not officially reported, but is reproduced in the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 38-42, Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (Nos. 79-1738, 80-945).
126. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 40, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (Nos. 79-1738, 80-
945).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 51. Although the court of appeals dismissed the appeal without an opinion,
both Petitioners and Respondents posited in their briefs to the Supreme Court that the
court of appeals had dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Brief for the
Petitioners at 26, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (Nos. 79-1738, 80-945); Brief for
Respondents at 20, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (Nos. 79-1738, 80-945).
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2. Arguments of the Parties before the Supreme Court
Defendants' petition for writ of certiorari challenged the district
court's disposition of both the absolute and qualified immunity defense,
as well as the court of appeals' ruling that pretrial denial of immunity
was not immediately appealable. As to the qualified immunity defense,
the petition posed the following question: "Whether the lower courts, in
routinely requiring a trial on the defense of qualified immunity, have
thereby vitiated the defense and thwarted this Court's decision in Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978)."129
In Butz, the Court had held executive officials were entitled to
qualified, rather than absolute, immunity. The Butz Court reasoned in
pertinent part that qualified immunity would allow "[insubstantial]
lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated."130  In their brief on the merits,
defendants argued trial courts had undermined the goal of disposing of
groundless claims by finding the subjective good faith of officials to be a
fact issue incapable of resolution on a motion for summary judgment.
Defendants submitted that "[a]llegations of malice and civil conspiracy,
weakly supported by factual inferences drawn from the slightest bits and
pieces of evidence, should no longer be allowed to serve as a simple
formula for defeating the pre-trial protection of qualified immunity."1 3'
Defendants did not urge the Court to abandon the common law
requirement that an official act in good faith to be immune. Instead,
defendants asked the Court to raise the evidentiary burden plaintiff
would have to meet to pose a triable issue of fact as to the defendants'
intent under the subjective prong of immunity. Defendants submitted
that after discovery, the plaintiff should be required to present sufficient
evidence of bad faith to satisfy either a preponderance of the evidence or
clear and convincing evidence standard. 13 2
129. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (Nos. 79-1738,
80-945).
130. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978).
131. Brief for Petitioners at 78, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (Nos. 79-1738, 80-945).
132. Id. at 79. Fitzgerald submitted a unified brief to the Court in response to the
separate writ of certiorari submitted by President Nixon as well as the writ submitted by
Harlow and Butterfield. Fitzgerald's brief focused largely on the issue of whether Nixon
should be absolutely immune. For the most part, Fitzgerald's brief consisted of lengthy
arguments involving Nixon, followed by a sentence or two which would tie in the case
involving Harlow and Butterfield to the argument just presented regarding Nixon. In
fact, Harlow and Butterfield were more often than not mentioned only in footnotes.
During oral argument, counsel for the officials reiterated that they were asking the
Court to require plaintiffs to prove malice by a standard stricter than a preponderance of
the evidence. Transcript of Oral Argument at * 14, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(Nos. 79-1738, 80-945), available at 1981 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 17. In response to Justice
Rehnquist's question as to whether adoption of the heightened burden of proof could
permit the granting of summary judgment, counsel replied that the Court could
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Fitzgerald opposed elevating the plaintiffs burden of proof on
summary judgment to clear and convincing evidence. Fitzgerald argued
that to apply a higher evidentiary standard to a pretrial motion for
judgment than the preponderance of evidence standard applicable at trial
would conflict with the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.'33 As
neither defendants nor the lower federal courts had mentioned or
advocated the position, Fitzgerald's brief did not address the merits of
jettisoning the common law and precedential requirement that an officer
subjectively act in good faith to be immune from paying damages for his
violation of the Constitution. 13 4
3. The Supreme Court Opinion
Vacating the subjective tier of immunity was neither presented by
the facts nor necessary to resolve the dispute before the Court as required
by the Court's Article III standards. The Court could have facilitated
disposition of meritless claims before trial by adopting the government
officials' urging to require proof of intent by clear and convincing
"significantly reduce the number of cases that would have to go to trial and increase the
number in which a motion for summary judgment was granted" if the Court were "to
enjoin upon the lower courts close scrutiny of allegations of malice, applying the two
standards of Wood against Strickland." Id. at *20 (emphasis added). Counsel then
agreed with the Court's unilateral suggestion that summary judgment would be even
easier to obtain were the malice requirement eliminated. Id. at *21.
133. Brief for the Respondent at 16, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (Nos. 79-1738, 80-945).
Fitzgerald further submitted that heightening the burden of proof would not aid
defendants in the instant case as the evidence of malice was substantial. Id.
134. The Court did not pose any questions to counsel for Fitzgerald at oral argument
regarding elimination of the subjective prong of immunity. Fitzgerald's counsel did
volunteer the following:
Justice White earlier asked a question about dropping malice as a requirement
from the qualified immunity standard. I think that in most cases, particularly
cases involving the powers of the Presidency in large scale public acts, it would
be very difficult or impossible for a plaintiff to demonstrate malice.
Transcript of Oral Argument at *46-47, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (Nos. 79-1738, 80-945),
available at 1981 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 17.
By revoking the subjective prong for Section 1983 actions, the Court contravened
the acknowledged intent of Congress to incorporate immunities extant at the time of
passage. As the Court's pre-Harlow decisions made clear, the common law required an
official to act in both objective and subjective good faith to be immune. The Supreme
Court has no power to depart from the intent of Congress to further its own policy
choices. See Malley v. Briggs, 45 U.S. 335, 342 (1986) ("We reemphasize that our role
is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a free-wheeling
policy choice, and that we are guided in interpreting Congress' intent by the common-law
tradition."). Nonetheless, as Justice Scalia subsequently conceded, the Harlow Court
"completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the
common law, replacing the inquiry into subjective malice so frequently required at
common law with an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the official
action." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
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evidence. In fact, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,13s the Supreme Court
subsequently adopted an approach to summary judgment that permits
trial courts to grant summary judgment as to issues of intent without
raising the burden of proof beyond the standard governing the trial. As
Justice Kennedy later acknowledged, the concerns that induced the
Harlow Court to eliminate the subjective good faith prerequisite to
immunity were allayed by these later developments in the Court's
summary judgment jurisprudence:
Harlow was decided at a time when the standards applicable to
summary judgment made it difficult for a defendant to secure
summary judgment regarding a factual question such as subjective
intent, even when the plaintiff bore the burden of proof ....
However, subsequent clarifications to summary judgment law have
alleviated that problem, by allowing summary judgment to be entered
against a non-moving party "who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element necessary to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, [citation omitted]. Under the principles set
forth in Celotex and related cases, the strength of factual allegations
such as subjective bad faith can be tested at the summary judgment
stage.' 36
Not only was it unnecessary to vacate the subjective tier to ensure
the pretrial disposition of meritless civil liberties suits; eliminating the
subjective prong of immunity would not necessarily result in dismissal of
Fitzgerald's suit on defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
district court had not denied summary judgment solely because of a
dispute of fact over defendants' subjective intent. The district court
further held there were material disputes of fact as to whether defendants
acted within the scope of their responsibilities and as to the
reasonableness of defendants' belief in the legality of their actions under
the objective aspect of qualified immunity.137 Accordingly, the Supreme
135. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
136. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). During oral argument, Justice
Stevens suggested the issue of whether the Air Force was reorganized in order to
eliminate Fitzgerald's job and get rid of Fitzgerald would remain even if the Court
accepted defendants' entreaty to raise the standard of proof for immunity. Transcript of
Oral Argument at *22, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (Nos. 79-1738, 80-945), available at 1981
U.S. Trans. LEXIS 17. Abolishing the subjective requisite to immunity also did not
remove the issue of defendants' intent from the Harlow litigation. The district court held
that the genuine issues of material fact as to defendants' good faith also were relevant to
the availability of punitive damages. The trial court ruled Fitzgerald may be entitled to
punitive damages if he proved the officials' actions were malicious or in reckless
disregard of Fitzgerald's rights, and that it had "not been established that such damages
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Court could not and did not enter judgment in favor of defendant
officials, but remanded the case to the court of appeals."'
As a result of the Court's sua sponte rewriting of the qualified
immunity defense, individual public officials are insulated from paying
damages caused by their unconstitutional actions, even when the official
acted maliciously, whenever the right violated was not clearly
established. Once the official is immunized, the citizen who suffered the
deprivation will be left without compensation for her injuries unless the
entity is liable for the harm. As will next be discussed, the Court greatly
contracted the circumstances under which local governments are
responsible for the constitutional torts of its officials, and entirely
removed any prospect that damages would be paid by state entities.13 9 In
both instances, the Court resolved the issue a) without benefit of the view
of the lower courts, b) without presentation of the issue by the parties
before the Court, and c) in violation of the Court's interpretation of the
Article III case or controversy requirement.
V. THE COURT SUA SPONTE REJECTED VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,
the Court ruled that local governmental entities are not vicariously liable
under Section 1983 for deprivations of federal constitutional rights
caused by their officials' actions.140  The issue of vicarious liability,
however, was not asserted before nor addressed by the lower federal
courts. None of the parties argued vicarious liability in the written
submissions to the Supreme Court. In fact, during oral argument,
plaintiffs' counsel expressly advised the Court he was not seeking to
hold the local government liable on a theory of respondeat superior.
Finally, the issue of vicarious liability was neither presented by the facts
are unavailable as a matter of law." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 40, Harlow, 457
U.S. 800 (1982) (Nos. 79-1738, 80-945).
138. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 820. The subsequent appellate history of Harlow is not
reported.
139. Citizens injured by unconstitutional conduct by federal officials may not file a
Bivens action against the federal government. In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1996), the Supreme Court held the purpose of Bivens was to deter
individual federal officials from violating the Constitution. The Court reasoned the
deterrent would be undermined were the government entity also liable. Furthermore,
given the prospect that entity liability would impose substantial financial obligations on
the federal government, Congress rather than the Court would have to authorize such
liability. Consequently, the citizen entirely bears the risk of loss from deprivations of
constitutional rights caused by federal officials whenever that right is not clearly
established.
140. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 713-14 (1978).
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of the case nor was it necessary for the Court to address respondeat
superior liability.
A. The Lower Court Opinions
In Monell, female employees of the City of New York Department
of Social Services and the City Board of Education filed a Section 1983
class action seeking damages for wages lost as a result of an
unconstitutional maternity leave policy. The policy required pregnant
employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before stopping work was
medically necessary. Plaintiffs sued the City, the Department and the
Board, as well as the individual heads of those entities in their official
capacities.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' Section 1983 damages
claim. 141 The Court first determined that under applicable precedents,
neither New York City, the Board of Education, nor the Department of
Social Services were "persons" who were subject to suit within the
language of Section 1983.142 The Court next considered whether
plaintiffs could recover damages in the count lodged against individual
local officials named as defendants in their official capacities. Because
plaintiffs' action against the individual officers asked that damages be
paid by the local entities, the Court ruled the suit was a prohibited action
against the municipal government. 14 3  Having determined neither the
municipal entities nor the individual officials in their official capacities
could be sued under Section 1983, the district court had no occasion to
consider whether local governments could be liable for damages on a
theory of vicarious liability.
The court of appeals similarly did not entertain the issue of
vicarious liability.144 Like the district court, the court of appeals held all
141. Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Plaintiffs also sought back pay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees. Plaintiffs further sought equitable relief under
Section 1983, asking the court to direct a change in maternity leave policies. The district
court denied the Title VII claims because at the time of the alleged discrimination,
governmental units were exempt from suit, and Congress did not intend the amendment
to Title VII to apply retroactively. The trial court also denied the Section 1983 claim for
equitable relief as moot. Defendants had changed their maternity leave policies and no
longer required female employees to report their pregnancies or to take maternity leaves
if they were medically able to perform their jobs. Id. at 855.
142. Id. (citing City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 912 U.S. 507, 513 (1973); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 188 (1961)).
143. See id. at 855-56.
144. The court agreed with the district court's conclusions that plaintiffs Title VII
claim for damages was barred because the 1972 amendment subjecting local
governments to damage suits for discrimination should not apply retroactively. Monell v.
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Section 1983 damage actions against municipalities-whether naming
governmental entities or officers in their official capacity as
defendants-were barred. The court of appeals rejected plaintiffs'
contention that the Board of Education is a body independent of the City
of New York. Because the Board performs a vital governmental function
and has no control over appropriation of its funds, the Court reasoned,
the Board is an arm of the City and is not a suable "person" under
Section 1983.145 The court of appeals further held that since the action
against the individual officials sought damages from governmental
coffers, it too was a claim against the entity that could not be lodged
under Section 1983.146 Having affirmed that none of the named
defendants was amenable to suit, the court of appeals had no cause to
mull over vicarious liability.
B. Arguments of the Parties Before the Supreme Court
As Justice Stevens acknowledged in his dissenting opinion in City
of Oklahoma v. Tuttle,14 7 "[t]he commentary on respondeat superior in
Monell was not responsive to any argument advanced by either party."
In their written submissions to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs never
argued local governmental entities should be held vicariously liable for
the constitutional wrongs of their employees. Plaintiffs first argued that
unlike cities and counties, school boards are "persons" under Section
1983 liable for their own unconstitutional actions. School boards,
plaintiffs argued, are not alter egos of the city or county, but have
significant linkages to the state and federal governments as well.148
Because the mandatory leave policy was admittedly a policy of the
school board, plaintiffs never submitted that school boards should be
vicariously liable for all actions of their employees.
Plaintiffs' alternate theory of liability against the individual officials
similarly did not rest on vicarious liability. Plaintiffs' brief expressly
noted they were not asserting a local government is liable for all
constitutional wrongs of its employees.14 9 Instead, plaintiffs contended
courts could direct a local official to expend public funds to remedy a
Dep't of Soc. Serv., 532 F.2d 259, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1976). The court of appeals also
agreed plaintiffs Section 1983 action seeking equitable relief was rendered moot by
changes in policy enacted after the lawsuit was filed. Id. at 261.
145. Id. at 263-64.
146. Id. at 265-66.
147. City of Okla. v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Brief for the Petitioners at 26-31, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1977) (No. 75-1914).
149. Brief for the Petitioners at 8, 33-34, 53, *3, n.*, Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (No. 75-
1914).
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deprivation of constitutional rights only "under certain narrow
circumstances."' 50  The court's power to restore funds wrongfully
withheld would be restricted to cases where the official who effected the
constitutional violation was "the chief executive or policy making body
of the city or county, or some other high ranking official authorized to
direct the expenditure of funds."' 5'
At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel made clear the action against
the individual officials was not a broad-based effort to impose respondeat
superior liability. Counsel clarified that if a high-ranking officer had not
caused the constitutional wrong or the individual defendant had no
authority to direct the expenditure of public funds, the person whose
rights were violated could not secure a damage award:
We are not saying that plaintiffs in Monroe could have sued Mayor
Daley of Chicago and obtained a judgment because some police
officers beat them up. Mayor Daley, in that case, did not wrongfully
exercise his official powers .. .. Nor could, under our view, the
plaintiff in Monroe sue the police officer, because, the-in his
official capacity-because the police officer, in that capacity, has no
authority to dispense public funds ... .152
In response to the Court's questioning, counsel unequivocally pledged he
was not pursuing a theory of vicarious liability:
Question: In other words, as I understand it, your argument in this
phase of the case is not at all dependent upon a
respondeat superior theory?
Mr. Chase: No, Your Honor, We believe that -
Question: Not a bit?
Mr. Chase: Not at all. 5 3
As plaintiff had abjured reliance on respondeat superior, defendants
did not ask the Court to repudiate vicarious liability were the Court to
find local governments are suable defendants under Section 1983.
Rather, defendants urged the Court to re-affirm its holding in Monroe
that the 1871 Congress did not intend to include local political
subdivisions within the class of "persons" that could be sued under
150. Id. at 33.
151. Id. at 34.
152. Transcript of Oral Argument Tr. at 11-12, Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1977) (No. 75-
1914).
153. Id. at 12.
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Section 1983.154 School boards, defendants offered, are indistinguishable
from other county and city entities immune from suit under Section
1983.5 Defendants implored the Court not to subvert that absolute bar
by allowing plaintiffs to access public funds through suits against
individual officials. 56
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
After revisiting the legislative history of Section 1983, the Court
reversed Monroe v. Pape, holding local governmental entities are
"persons" that could be sued for damages under Section 1983. The
Court ruled local governments would be liable for unconstitutional action
that, as in Monell, "implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body's officers." 57
The facts of the case presented no issue of vicarious liability for
actions not sanctioned by the entity itself.58 The Court observed that
"unquestionably" the "official policy" of New York City and its agencies
required pregnancy leave before it was medically necessary.159 The
Court expressly noted, "we have no occasion to address, and do not
address, what the full contours of municipal liability under § 1983 may
be." 60 The Court declined to examine whether municipalities could
assert immunity available to its officials because the issue was not
addressed by the lower courts, presented as a question in the petition for
certiorari, or briefed by the parties.' 6 ' The issue of vicarious liability met
the same criteria, and was not presented by the facts of the case. In what
Justice Stevens later labeled "judicial legislation of the most blatant
154. Defendants conceded Congress has the power to hold local governments
vicariously liable for constitutional wrongs of its employees. Brief for the Respondents
at 10-11, Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1977) (No. 75-1914). Defendants further allowed that if
Congress had intended to bring local governments within the ambit of Section 1983, "an
argument could be made for the imposition of respondeat superior liability" upon the
entity where the officer would be liable. Id. at 33. Defendants, however, urged the Court
to adopt a general rule rejecting all local governmental liability for damages under
Section 1983. Id. at 33-34.
155. Brief for the Respondent at 12-23, Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (No. 75-1914).
156. Id. at 23-35.
157. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (1977).
158. The Court's unilateral decision to address and reject respondeat superior was not
necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice to the defendants, as they admitted that the
policy of the governmental entities mandated what proved to be an unconstitutional
medical leave policy.
159. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
160. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695.
161. Id.at701.
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kind,"1 62 the Court nonetheless ruled a local government may not be held
liable for its officers' constitutional misdeeds on a theory of respondeat
supenor.
Monell launched the Court on a decades-long quest to define which
acts of municipal employees constitute "policy."1 63  The Court has
generated a web of cases so confusing that four members of the Court
suggested the time had come to reexamine the soundness of the rejection
of vicarious municipal liability.'6 Equally significantly, by eliminating
local government as a defendant in Section 1983 actions for
constitutional invasions that do not rise to the level of policy or custom,
the Court left victims without compensation whenever the individual
employee was immune or judgment-proof.
VI. THE COURT VIOLATED THE TENETS OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND
ARTICLE III WHEN IT HELD STATE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ARE
NOT SUABLE UNDER SECTION 1983
The Monell Court cast aside settled principles of judicial restraint
and the Article III case and controversy requirement to reject vicarious
liability of local governments under Section 1983. One year later, in
Quern v. Jordan,1 65 the Court sua sponte determined states may never be
held liable for damages caused by the unconstitutional actions of their
employees, even if those acts represent the policy or custom of the state.
To understand the Supreme Court's exemption of States from
liability for damages under Section 1983, it is imperative to keep an eye
162. City of Okla. v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. In determining acts of local officials that do and do not constitute policy, the
Court continued its penchant for issuing decisions on matters not argued by the parties.
See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 423 (1997)
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("If, as it appears, today's standard does raise the threshold of
municipal liability, it does so quite independently of any issue posed or decided in the
trial court.").
164. Bd. of the County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
430 (1997) (Souter, Breyer and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Id. at 437 (Breyer, Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Ironically, these Justices believed it necessary to receive the
arguments of counsel on the matter rather than unilaterally overrule Monell and endorse
vicarious municipal liability under Section 1983. Id. at 436-37 (Breyer, Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
In City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 835-41 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion lays out the case for respondeat superior liability of
local governments. Several commentators have likewise argued in favor of vicarious
entity liability. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section
1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 755 (1992); Barbara Kritchevsky, Reexamining
Monell: Basing § 1983 Liability Doctrine on the Statutory Language, 31 URB. LAW. 437
(1999); David Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: § 1983 and the Debate Over
Respondeat Superior, 73 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2183 (2005).
165. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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on the then-existing state of the Supreme Court's rulings on municipal
liability. The Supreme Court had adjudged the liability of municipal
entities before it addressed the amenability of states to suits for damages
under Section 1983. In 1961, the Court in Monroe v. Pape held
Congress did not intend to include cities as "persons" that could be sued
under Section 1983.166 Thirteen years later, in Edelman v. Jordan,16 7 the
Court for the first time was asked to decide whether Congress intended to
authorize suits against states under Section 1983. In a single sentence
with no citation to authority, the Edelman Court ruled, "[I]t has not
heretofore been suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a waiver of
a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could
be brought under that section against state officers, rather than against
the State itself." l 68
Two years later, the Court supplied the rationale and citation
missing from its Edelman opinion. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,169 the Court
held Congress harbored the power under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to override the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
Court further opined Congress intended to exercise that power when it
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974 to authorize suits for
money damages against state governments that engage in employment
discrimination. The Court distinguished Edelman. Unlike the
Amendments to Title VII, the Court reasoned, Congress did not intend to
authorize suits against states when it enacted Section 1983. The Court
then elaborated on its earlier ruling in Edelman: "The Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, had been held in Monroe v. Pape to exclude
cities and other municipal corporations from its ambit; that being the
case, it could not have been intended to include states as parties
defendant."170 Thus it became clear the Edelman Court had found
Congress did not intend states to be suable "persons" under Section 1983
because the Court in Monroe v. Pape already had held the legislature did
not mean to subject local governments to liability under the same statute.
The Court overruled Monroe in Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York. The Monell Court expressly stated its
holding was limited to local governmental entities, which do not share
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 17 1 However, Monell upset
the lone rationale for the Edelman Court's finding that Congress did not
intend to subject states to Section 1983 damage actions. After Monell,
166. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
167. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
168. Id. at 675-77.
169. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
170. Id. at 452.
171. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serys., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.54 (1978).
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the issue of Congress' intent with respect to the liability of states under
Section 1983 became an open question.
Eight months after issuing its Monell decision, the Court in Quern v.
Jordan'7 2 held Congress did not intend to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The Quern Court wholly sheltered states from
paying damages for constitutional deprivations of their officials even
though a) the issue had not been raised before or addressed by the lower
federal courts; b) both parties agreed the issue was not before the
Supreme Court; and c) the issue was neither presented by the facts of the
case nor was it necessary for the Court to address the question.
A. The Lower Court Opinions
Quern v. Jordan arose out of the same lawsuit that had spawned the
Court's opinion in Edelman. Individuals seeking benefits under the State
of Illinois' Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled program claimed state
officials had delayed determining their eligibility in violation of federal
regulations and the Fourteenth Amendment. Among other things,
plaintiffs asked the court to order retroactive payment of funds they
would have received had the Department acted in the prescribed time
frame. The Edelman Court ruled a federal court would offend the
Eleventh Amendment were it to order the state to pay past benefits from
its treasury. On remand, plaintiffs asked the district court to order state
officials to send notices to members of the class "explaining their
possible entitlement to retroactive benefits and the appropriate state
administrative and appeals procedures to be followed in applying for
those benefits." 7 3 Defendant officials resisted, arguing the proposed
order violated the Eleventh Amendment since providing notice of state
remedies eventually could lead to monetary recovery from state coffers.
The lower federal court proceedings preceded the Supreme Court's
Monell opinion that unsettled Edelman. Therefore, it is not surprising
that neither the district court nor the court of appeals addressed whether
Congress intended to abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it enacted Section 1983. Instead, the courts debated
whether ordering state officials to issue the notice was prospective relief
that does not amount to an action against the state within the meaning of
the Eleventh Amendment, or retroactive relief that runs afoul of the
Amendment.17 4
172. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
173. Jordan v. Trainor, 405 F. Supp. 802, 805 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
174. In Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court held a citizen who suffered a
deprivation of federal constitutional rights may file a federal court suit against a state
official, in his official capacity, as long as the relief sought was prospective. In what
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The district court held because the notice sought by plaintiffs did
not order payment of retroactive benefits, the order "falls outside the
arena proscribed by the Supreme Court's Edelman opinion."l 75 The
court of appeals reversed, finding the practical consequence of the letter
of notification equivalent to an order directing payment of retroactive
benefits by the state that is barred by the Supreme Court's ruling in
Edelman.'7 6  Following a rehearing en banc, the court of appeals
reversed the panel decision. The en banc court held merely sending
notice of the right to seek a state administrative determination of
entitlement to past payments does not constitute retroactive relief against
the state within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. 77
As Monell had not yet been decided, the lower courts obviously
were not presented with the question of whether to reconsider the issue
of Congress' intent as to state liability under Section 1983. Accordingly,
neither the district court, the three judge panel of the court of appeals,
nor the court of appeals sitting en banc addressed whether Congress
intended to trump the Eleventh Amendment when it passed Section
1983.
B. Arguments of the Parties Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court issued its Monell decision after the defendant
state welfare officials filed their petition for writ of certiorari and
opening brief on the merits.178 Consequently neither the cert petition nor
the initial brief addressed whether Monell undermined the Court's
opinion in Edelman. To the contrary, the officials' initial brief argued
the court of appeals' en banc decision violated the law of the case
became known as the Ex Parte Young "fiction," the Court reasoned that by acting
unconstitutionally, the state official was "stripped of his official ... character and is
subject in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct." Id. at 160. Despite
being construed as individual action for Eleventh Amendment purposes, the state official
is deemed to be acting under color of law for purposes of Section 1983. The fiction that
the individual official is not the State is pierced, however, where the complaint seeks
damages from the treasury of the State.
175. Jordan, 405 F. Supp. at 805.
176. Jordan v. Trainor, 551 F. 2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1977).
177. Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F. 2d 873, 874 (7th Cir. 1977). The en banc court agreed
with the panel that the language in that notice, "you were denied public assistance to
which you were entitled in the amount of $ . . .," did in effect require the retroactive
payment of state funds. However, a "mere explanatory notice" advising applicants they
are entitled to use available state administrative procedures to have the state determine
eligibility for past benefits would not constitute a federal court order that applicants were
entitled to retroactive benefits.
178. The defendants filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 12, 1977
and their brief on the merits on June 3, 1978. The Court issued its decision in Monell on
June 6, 1978. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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established by the Supreme Court's Edelman decision.179 Because the
notice sent to applicants for benefits would result in payment of funds
from the state treasury as reparation for past wrongdoing, defendants
submitted, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from ordering
such notice.180
The successive brief of the plaintiffs and the defendant officials'
reply brief, were filed after the Court overruled Monroe in Monell.
However, both parties agreed the Court need not address whether
Congress intended to permit suits against states for damages under
Section 1983.181 Plaintiffs' brief argued that the federal court's order
requiring state officials to send notice of plaintiffs' right to appeal the
denial of benefits through available state administrative mechanism did
not even present an Eleventh Amendment issue. Plaintiffs repeatedly
acknowledged principles of sovereign immunity embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment are designed to protect the states' financial
integrity and bar federal courts from ordering states to pay money
damages for constitutional violations. 18 2  Plaintiffs submitted that the
notice ordered by the lower courts does not award damages from the
state treasury, but leaves the state to determine its own monetary
liability.' Rather than suggest Monell opened the door to state liability
under Section 1983, plaintiffs used the just-issued Monell opinion to
support its view that the decree enforced federal rights "without
unreasonably intruding upon state sovereignty., 1 8 4  By vesting the
ultimate decision whether to award back benefits in the state's own
administrative agency, plaintiffs averred, the lower courts acted
consistent with the principles of federalism inherent in Section 1983.185
Both parties expressly advised the Court it need not decide whether
Congress intended to permit suits for damages against states under
Section 1983. Because the district court did not award money damages
and issued its equitable decree only against individual state officials
rather than against a state entity, plaintiffs' brief specified, "it is
179. Brief for the Petitioner at 14, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (No. 77-
841).
180. Brief for the Petitioner at 33-34, Quern, 440 U.S. 332 (No. 77-841).
181. The State of Indiana filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the defendant
officials. Indiana's amicus brief did not address Section 1983 on whether the State is a
"person" under that statute. Instead, the State argued the notice approved by the court of
appeals is retroactive relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Brief for State of
Indiana as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9-10, Quern, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (No.
77-841).
182. Brief for the Respondents at 23-47, 54-55, 62, Quern, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (No.
77-841).
183. Id. at 10.
184. Id. at 47.
185. Id. at 47-64.
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unnecessary in this case to confront directly the far-reaching question of
whether Congress intended in § 1983 to provide for relief directly against
States, as it did against municipalities."1 86 While noting Monell did not
answer whether states are liable for damages, the state officials' reply
brief agreed that "the en banc decision of the Seventh Circuit does not
rest upon the conclusion that the term persons for purposes of § 1983
includes sovereign states, as opposed to state officials, within its ambit.
That issue is not the issue before this Court on Petitioner's Writ for
Certiorari."
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiffs that ordering state
officials to notify welfare recipients of available state administrative
remedies, while reserving to state agencies the ultimate decision whether
to award past benefits, did not conflict with the Eleventh Amendment.
Despite finding the district court's order did not clash with the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court opted first to resolve the very issue both parties
expressly declared was not before the Court.188 The Court held Congress
did not intend to exert its power to override the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity with the passage of Section 1983.189 Thus states
may not be sued or held liable under Section 1983 for damages for the
constitutional deprivations of their officials.
As with its three-fold expansion of the qualified immunity defense
and rejection of vicarious municipal liability, the Quern Court's
exclusion of states from the ambit of Section 1983 not only was bereft of
the views of the lower federal courts and the submissions of counsel;
there was no Article III case or controversy as to that issue. Because the
notice to the applicants was not retroactive relief against the state for
Eleventh Amendment purposes, the facts did not present the question
whether Congress intended to permit federal courts to issue orders that
would conflict with that amendment. Furthermore, the court of appeals'
en banc opinion approving the notice would stand regardless of how the
Court resolved whether Congress intended to allow federal court actions
against states when it enacted Section 1983. Justice Brennan vigorously
186. Id. at 55 n.37.
187. Reply Brief for the State Petitioner at 14, Quern, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (No. 77-
841).
188. The majority alleged plaintiffs had raised the issue whether Monell undermined
the vitality of the Court's Edelman holding in footnote 37 of the plaintiff's brief. Quern,
440 U.S. at 338. As noted earlier, in that very footnote plaintiffs expressly stated it was
unnecessary for the Court to confront that question. Brief for Respondents at 55 n.37,
Quern, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (No. 77-841). See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
189. Quern, 440 U.S. at 341.
2010] 1373
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
criticized the Court's election to tackle the issue of the 1871 Congress'
intent to trump the Eleventh Amendment: "It is deeply disturbing,
however, that the Court should engage in today's gratuitous departure
from customary judicial practice and reach out to decide an issue
unnecessary to its holding." 90
The Court's redrafting of qualified immunity, repudiation of
respondeat superior liability of local governmental entities, and
exoneration of states from Section 1983 damage actions increasingly
leaves victims of unconstitutional government action without
compensation for their injuries. Whenever the right was not clearly
established, citizens harmed by deprivations of constitutional liberties by
federal or state officials will recover no damages, even if the official
intended the injury; where the wrongdoer is an officer of the local
government, the victim will receive compensation only in the narrow
circumstances when the official's action represents municipal policy or
custom. 19,
VII. IQBAL ADDED A PREREQUISITE TO SUPERVISORY LIABILITY THAT
WAS NEITHER RAISED BELOW NOR PRESENTED TO THE COURT BY
THE PARTIES
Iqbal weakened one of the few remaining arrows in the remedial
quiver of the citizen whose fundamental constitutional rights have been
infringed. The Iqbal Court erected an additional-and perhaps even
insurmountable-obstacle to imposing liability on an official for
misfeasance in supervising the employee who physically deprived the
citizen of his constitutional liberty. The supervisor is no longer liable
solely because his personal involvement was a cause of the subordinate's
unconstitutional conduct. Instead, plaintiff may recover damages from
the supervisor only by proving the supervisor's own actions violate the
190. Quern v. Jordan, 438 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring).
191. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)
(single act of official constitutes policy only where, under state law, that official was
person responsible for establishing final policy); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378
(1989) (failure to train amounts to policy only where need for more or different training
is so obvious, and inadequacy so likely to result in violation of constitutional rights, that
policymakers can reasonably be deemed to have been deliberately indifferent); Bd. of the
County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (local government
liable for wrongful hiring of employee who inflicted constitutional violation only where
plaintiff proves entity was deliberately indifferent to risk that the officer was highly likely
to inflict that particular injury). The Iqbal opinion is likely to open the question whether,
as in actions against supervisory officers, plaintiff must prove an even higher standard of
culpability to hold local governments liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
employees. See Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and
Supervisory Liability after Iqbal, 14 LEwis AND CLARK L. REv. 279, 308 (2010).
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Constitution. As with its line of decisions expanding individual
immunity and diminishing entity liability, the Court promulgated a
standard of supervisory liability a) that the officers did not proffer before
the lower courts or advocate before the Supreme Court, and b) which
was not necessary to resolve the dispute.
A. The Lower Court Opinions
1. The District Court
Plaintiff Javard Iqbal, a Muslim from Pakistan, was arrested for
offenses unrelated to terrorism shortly after the September 11 attacks.19 2
Iqbal was classified as a person "of high interest" to the government's
investigation of terrorism. As a result, Iqbal was transferred from the
general population to the far more restrictive confinement of the
Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit ("ADMAX-SHU") of
the Metropolitan Detention Center. Federal Bureau of Prison regulations
require periodic individual reviews to determine whether continued
detention in the ADMAX-SHU is merited.' 93 Iqbal was never afforded
these individualized periodic reviews. Instead, an alleged policy adopted
in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks required detainees of high
interest to be held in ADMAX-SHU until the FBI cleared them of
linkage to terrorist activity.
While in ADMAX-SHU, Iqbal and his co-plaintiff Elmaghraby
alleged they were subject to the following conditions of confinement:
[T]hey were (1) kept in solitary confinement; (2) prohibited from
leaving their cells for more than one hour each day with few
exceptions; (3) verbally and physically abused; (4) routinely subject
to humiliating and unnecessary strip searched; (5) denied access to
basic medical care; (6) denied access to legal counsel; (7) denied
adequate exercise and nutrition; (8) housed in small cells where the
lights were left on almost 24 hours a day; (9) deliberately subjected to
air conditioning during the winter months and heat during the
summer months; (10) deprived of adequate bedding or personal
hygiene items; and (11) they were deprived of adequate food, as a
result of which Iqbal lost over 40 pounds (and suffers from persistent
digestive problems) and Elmaghraby lost 20 pounds.194
192. Iqbal was arrested for fraud in relation to identification documents and
conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1028.
Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434 at * 3 n. I (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
193. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(c).
194. Elmaghraby, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434 at *13.
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Iqbal sued not only the officials with whom he had direct contact at
the Detention Center, but also the Warden of the Center, Federal Bureau
of Prison Officials, FBI officials, FBI Director Mueller and Attorney
General Ashcroft. Plaintiff alleged all defendants were personally
involved in either creating or implementing the "hold and clear" policy
that deviated from the administrative requirement that individual reviews
be conducted to justify continued confinement in ADMAX-SHU. Iqbal
further averred defendants were aware of the conditions of confinement
in ADMAX-SHU and subjected Iqbal to those harsh conditions because
of Iqbal's religious beliefs and race.
Since Ashcroft and Mueller were the two petitioners before the
Supreme Court, this section will focus only on the district court's
analysis of their motion to dismiss on the ground that there were
insufficient allegations of supervisory liability. 19 Iqbal claimed Ashcroft
and Mueller were liable for three constitutional violations. First, Iqbal
averred his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment was violated
by the policy of assigning him to ADMAX-SHU without an opportunity
to challenge the continued administrative detention. Second, Iqbal
asserted that defendants infringed the First Amendment by subjecting
Iqbal to the harsher conditions of confinement because of his religious
beliefs. Finally, Iqbal claimed confinement in ADMAX-SHU was based
on his race in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
Iqbal did not seek to hold Ashcroft and Mueller liable on a theory of
respondeat superior. Iqbal claimed that it was Ashcroft and Mueller who
approved the "hold until cleared" policy.196  Iqbal further alleged that
while fully aware all detainees "of high interest" were housed in the most
restrictive conditions possible until cleared by the FBI, Ashcroft and
Mueller failed to promulgate deadlines for the clearance process.19 7
The district court did not deny Ashcroft and Mueller's motion to
dismiss by finding they were vicariously liable for actions of
subordinates. To the contrary, the court ruled "[a] government official
may not be held liable for a constitutional tort under a theory of
respondeat superior; instead a plaintiff must establish that the official
195. Ashcroft and Mueller also argued a) the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction; b) they were entitled to qualified immunity; and c) a Bivens action should
not be available because of "special factors," in particular (i) the origin of the claims in
the events following September 11 and, (ii) immigration statutes provide a
comprehensive remedial scheme for persons like Iqbal challenging detention pending
renewal.
196. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11 (citing Complaint 69).
197. Id. at *1I1- 12.
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was personally involved in the alleged violations."' 98 The district court
ruled the complaint sufficiently alleged Ashcroft and Mueller were
involved in the "creation and/or implementation of the hold and clear
policy" that violated the Constitution."' Indeed, Iqbal pleaded Ashcroft
was the "principal architect of the challenged policies."20 0 Iqbal's
averment, the district court noted, was supported by an April 2003 report
of the Office of Inspector General. The report "suggests the involvement
of Ashcroft [and] the FBI Defendants ... in creating or implementing a
policy under which plaintiffs were confined in restrictive conditions until
cleared by the FBI from involvement in terrorist activities." 201 The court
further observed Iqbal had alleged Ashcroft and Mueller were actually
aware of the unusually restrictive conditions of confinement in
ADMAX-SHU resulting from the policy they had created.
There is no indication Ashcroft or Mueller argued the culpability
pre-requisite to supervisory liability eventually adopted by the United
States Supreme Court. Ashcroft and Mueller posited the Complaint
lacked sufficient nonconclusory, factual allegations of their personal
202involvement. However, the district court's opinion gives no indication
defendants argued that even if personally involved in the creation of the
policy resulting in subordinate officials' physically depriving Iqbal of his
constitutional rights, Ashcroft and Mueller could not be held liable
unless their own conduct was sufficiently culpable to constitute an
independent violation of the Constitution.
2. The Court of Appeals
As was true of the district court proceedings, neither Iqbal nor the
court of appeals sought to impose liability on Ashcroft and Iqbal on a
theory of vicarious liability. Quite the opposite, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reasoned, "'[O]ur task is to consider whether, as a
matter of law, the factual allegations and all reasonable inferences
therefrom are insufficient to establish the required showing of personal
198. Id. at *37. See also id. at *46 ("As in §1983 actions, there is no respondeat
superior liability in a Bivens action.").
199. Id. at *65.
200. Id. at *66, n.20. While finding sufficient allegation of personal involvement of
Ashcroft and Mueller, the district court dismissed these claims against Bureau of Prison
Officials. The court reasoned that, while enforcing the policies, the BOP Officials were
not involved in the allegedly unconstitutional classification of all arrested Arab Muslim
men as of "high interest" to the investigation of the September 11 attacks. Id. at *94.
The district court also dismissed claims of unconstitutional searches against former
Director of the Bureau Programs Kathleen Hawk Sawyer on the ground that the
complaint did not allege her involvement in the searches. Id. at *86.
201. Id. at *66, n. 20.
202. Id. at *38.
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involvement."' 20 3 The court identified five available means of satisfying
that requirement:
The personal involvement of a supervisor may be established by
showing that he (a) directly participated in the violation, (2) failed to
remedy the violation after being informed of it by report or appeal,
(3) created a policy or custom under which the violation occurred, (4)
was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the
violation, or (5) was deliberately indifferent to the rights of others by
failing to act on information that constitutional rights were being
violated.204
Ashcroft and Mueller contended that Iqbal had failed to allege their
personal involvement in the deprivation of procedural due process
violation because the decision to continue to detain Iqbal in ADMAX-
SHU was made by subordinate FBI officials. 205 The court of appeals
rejected that argument. The court pointed to Iqbal's allegations that
Ashcroft and Mueller "condoned the policy under which the Plaintiff was
held in harsh conditions of confinement until 'cleared' by the FBI."206
Because due process mandates additional procedural safeguards to
prolong Iqbal's confinement in the ADMAX-SHU, the court concluded
defendants' approval of the hold until cleared policy established the
plausibility of their personal involvement for purposes of surviving a
motion to dismiss.207
The court of appeals similarly found Iqbal had lodged sufficient
allegations to establish the personal involvement of Ashcroft and Mueller
in the deprivation of Iqbal's right to be free of religious and racial
discrimination. Iqbal had asserted "all Arab Muslim men arrested on
criminal or immigration charges while the FBI was following an
investigative lead into the September 11 attacks-however unrelated the
arrestee was to the investigation-were immediately classified as 'of
interest' to the post September 11th investigation."208 The fact that it
was lower-level FBI officials who determined Iqbal was of high interest
203. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Newburgh
Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 2001)).
204. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.2d at 152.
205. Id. at 165.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 166. "Even as to Ashcroft and Mueller, it is plausible to believe that senior
officials of the Justice Department would be aware of policies concerning the detention
of those arrested by the federal officers in the New York City area in the aftermath of
9/11 and would know about, condone, or otherwise have personal involvement in the
implementation of those policies." Id. at 167. The court of appeals found the right to
procedural due process was not clearly established and dismissed that claim on the
ground of qualified immunity. Id. at 167-68.
208. Elmaghraby, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *95 (quoting Complaint 52).
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solely because of his race, ethnic background and religion did not obviate
the supervisors' accountability for actions of those subordinates. Iqbal
alleged Ashcroft and Mueller had condoned and agreed to this
discrimination. The court of appeals reasoned this allegation was
plausible, without pleading further facts, "because of the likelihood that
these senior officials would have concerned themselves with the
formulation and implementation of policies dealing with confinement of
those arrested on federal charges in the New York City area and
designated 'of high interest' in the aftermath of 9/11 ."209
The court of appeals' opinion offered no hint that Ashcroft and
Mueller submitted that lqbal should be required to prove they
independently disregarded constitutional norms. Defendants had argued
the allegations that subordinate FBI officials classified Iqbal of high
interest because of race, ethnic background and religion were too
conclusory to state a claim.210 Nowhere did the court of appeals indicate
Ashcroft and Mueller asserted that Iqbal was required to plead they
shared the discriminatory animus of those subordinate FBI defendants.
Rather, the court concluded liability could be imposed if Ashcroft and
Mueller were found to have condoned or agreed to the discrimination of
those under their command.2 11
B. Arguments of the Parties Before the Supreme Court
Ashcroft and Mueller presented two questions to the Supreme
Court. The first question challenged the level of specificity required to
plead a cause of action, the issue that has spawned so much commentary
post-Iqbal.212 The second question addressed the appropriate substantive
standard for liability of supervisors. More particularly, Ashcroft and
Mueller contended they could not be held liable for unconstitutional
actions of subordinates of which they had constructive, but not actual
notice.2 13
209. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 175-76.
210. Id. at 175.
211. Id. at 175.
212. The first Question Presented was "Whether a conclusory allegation that a
cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official knew of, or condoned, or agreed to
subject a plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts purposely committed by subordinate
officials is sufficient to state individual-capacity claims against those officials under
Bivens." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)
(No. 07-1015).
213. The second Question Presented was "Whether a cabinet-level officer or high
ranking official may be held personally liable for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of
subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level supervisors, they had constructive
notice of the discrimination allegedly carried out by such subordinate officials." Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015).
2010] 1379
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Ashcroft and Mueller did not maintain they could be held liable
only if their own actions were unconstitutional. Indeed, they conceded
high-level officials could be sued not only for their direct involvement in
deprivations of constitutional rights, but also for "their deliberate
indifference in the face of information that the rights of others are being
violated."2 14 Ashcroft and Muller quarreled with the court of appeals'
alleged imposition of liability for wrongdoing of which the Attorney
General and FBI Director did not actually know. Supervisory liability in
the absence of actual knowledge of malfeasance, they submitted, would
be ineffective in deterring official wrongdoing.2 15 Ashcroft and Mueller
further claimed the Court had rejected supervisory liability under Section
1983 on a theory of constructive notice.216 Finally, they cited the Court's
precedents on the liability of municipalities under Section 1983, which
generally require deliberate indifference to the risk that employees would
infringe constitutional rights.217 Under these precedents, constructive
knowledge of wrongdoing would not give rise to liability. Instead,
Ashcroft and Mueller averred, "[t]he proper standard for supervisory
liability would preclude liability unless petitioners had actual knowledge
of the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classification of suspects as
being of 'high interest' and they were deliberately indiferent to that
discrimination."2 18
Iqbal made clear that he was not asking the Court to endorse
vicarious liability of supervisory officials. To the contrary, Iqbal agreed
"it is undisputed that supervisory Bivens liability cannot be established
214. Initial Brief of Appellants at 14, 44, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-
1015).
215. Id. at 45-46.
216. Id. at 48-49. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015) ("In [Rizzo v. Goode], the Court held a plaintiff under Section
1983 has to establish ... an affirmative link between the acts of the subordinates and the
higher level officials and we think that that substantive rule in Section 1983 at a
minimum carries over to the Bivens context.").
217. Initial Brief of Appellants at 49-50, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-
1015).
218. Id. at 50 (emphasis added). Ashcroft and Mueller tendered that same legal
standard in their Reply Brief. Reply Brief at 22, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009) (No. 07-1015). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015) ("[T]he mere fact of supervisory authority is not an adequate
basis for holding petitioners liable for alleged wrongdoing committed by others, absent
facts showing that they had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of wrongdoing and that
their failure to take action was the proximate cause of respondent's alleged injuries.").
See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari 25-29, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-
1015) (advocating supervisors may be liable only when they are deliberately indifferent,
which requires actual, as opposed to constructive, knowledge of wrongdoing by
subordinates).
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solely on a theory of respondeat superior."219 Instead, Iqbal asserted he
had adequately pleaded two independent bases for liability resting on the
personal involvement of Ashcroft and Mueller.22 0 First, Iqbal advanced
that Ashcroft and Mueller could be held liable for creating the policy that
impermissibly classified detainees based upon race, religion and national
origin. Alternatively, Ashcroft and Mueller were suable for their
"knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates' use of
discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions among
detainees."2 21
Iqbal stressed that the second theory of liability did not rest upon
defendants' constructive, as opposed to actual, notice of subordinate
wrongdoing. Iqbal asserted all parties agreed a supervisor is liable for
his "knowing acquiescence to subordinates' unconstitutional conduct."2 2 2
Iqbal argued the Second Circuit had not approved any theory of liability
based upon constructive knowledge. 2 23 Rather, the court of appeals had
found the Complaint alleged Mueller and Ashcroft "knew of, condoned
and agreed to subject respondent to harsh conditions of confinement
solely because of his membership in a protected class." 22 4
C. The Supreme Court's Opinion
The Supreme Court reframed the issue to a choice between a theory
of liability that Iqbal never advocated and a theory of defense never
proffered by Ashcroft or Mueller. In a portion of its opinion spanning at
most three paragraphs, the Court reasoned that in order to avoid
respondeat superior liability, plaintiff must prove the supervisor acted
with sufficient culpability to constitute his own violation of the
Constitution.225 As Iqbal asserted a deprivation of rights under the Equal
Protection Clause, Ashcroft and Mueller could be liable only if they
acted with the purpose to discriminate. The Court then held Iqbal's
219. Brief of Respondent at 46, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015). See
also Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015)
("[T]here might be a respondeat superior theory [in a tort action against the president of
Coca Cola] for liability, that we don't have access to in the Bivens arena, which we
concede.").
220. Id. at 45. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009) (No. 07-1015) ("Your Honor, we have two different theories .... One is
knowledge of and approval of, and the other is direction.").
221. Brief of Respondents at 45-46, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015).
222. Id. at 46. See also id. at 38 ("[P]etitioners concede that an allegation that
petitioners knew and acquiesced in discriminatory conduct ... would state a claim.").
223. Id. at 12. Iqbal made clear that he was not relying on a theory of gross
negligence, and the Second Circuit did not apply that standard of culpability. Id. at 12-
13.
224. Id. at 7.
225. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
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Complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to plausibly
demonstrate Ashcroft and Mueller acted with the requisite discriminatory
state of mind.
As Justice Souter observed in dissent, the Court sua sponte adopted
226
a test for supervisory liability never briefed or argued by the parties.
All parties had agreed supervisors could be held liable for deliberate
indifference to unconstitutional conduct of subordinates of which the
officials were aware. The disagreement was whether Iqbal was resting
upon, or could succeed upon, a theory of liability that held supervisors
liable where they had constructive, but not actual, knowledge of
subordinate misconduct.
Even Professor Sheldon Nahmod, the leading academic supporter of
the outcome the Court reached in Iqbal,2 27 was critical of the Court's
acting unilaterally to require plaintiffs to prove the supervisor
independently violated the Constitution:
Whatever one thinks should be the proper standard for supervisory
liability, it is surprising from a process perspective that the Court
announced that it was adopting the constitutional approach to
supervisory liability under the circumstances of no briefing and no
argument. This is particularly troubling because the circuits for the
most part have adopted the causation approach. At the very least, the
Court should have explained itself much more than it did.228
Justice Souter's denunciation of the process by which the Court
arrived at its new standard of supervisory liability applies equally to the
court's sua sponte refashioning of the qualified immunity standard,
insulation of state entities from accountability, and rejection of vicarious
liability of local governments:
Ashcroft and Mueller have, as noted, made the critical concession
that a supervisor's knowledge of a subordinate's unconstitutional
conduct and deliberate indifference to that conduct are grounds for
Bivens liability.
226. Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting).
227. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983
Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1982); SHELDON N. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION §§ 3.97 - 3.98 (4b ed. 2009).
228. Nahmod, supra note 225, at 292-93. Professor Kinports's companion piece in
this Symposium effectively spells out the substantive critique of the Iqbal Court's
insistence that victims of deprivations of constitutional rights must prove the supervisor
violated the constitutional norm to prevail-arguments that were never presented to the
Court. Kit Kinports, Iqbal and Supervisory Immunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1291 (2010).
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[B]ecause of that concession, we have received no briefing or
argument on the proper scope of supervisory liability, much less the
full-dress argument we normally require. We consequently are in no
position to decide the precise contours of supervisory liability here,
this issue being a complicated one that has divided the Courts of
Appeals. This Court recently remarked on the danger of "bad
decision making" when the briefing on a question is "woefully
inadequate," yet today the majority answers a question with no
briefing at all. The attendant risk of error is palpable.
Finally, the Court's approach is most unfair to Iqbal. He was entitled
to rely on Ashcroft and Mueller's concession.... By overriding that
concession, the court denies Iqbal a fair chance to be heard on the
question. 229
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has consistently slighted constitutional and
prudential constraints on its decision-making to shelter government and
its officials from accountability for constitutional wrongs. The Court's
readiness to adopt doctrines favoring government that were neither
preserved below, lodged before the Court, nor presented by the facts
stands in stark relief to the Court's strict application of Article III case
and controversy requirements to deny equitable relief to persons
complaining of constitutional violations. The Court's selective disregard
and invocation of the four restraints on its role and power suggest the
Court is pursuing an agenda at odds with the intent of the legislature that
enacted Section 1983 to provide a broad remedy to citizens deprived of
their constitutional rights. 23 0
229. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also noted
that in light of the Court's finding that allegations of Ashcroft and Mueller's knowledge
of subordinates misconduct were conclusory and thus could not sustain factual
plausibility, it was unnecessary for the Court to impose a new standard of liability to
resolve the case. Id. at 1958. Of course, the Court also could have disposed of the case
by accepting the position actually advocated by Ashcroft and Mueller.
230. An inkling of the Court's ambition might be found in the following passage from
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting):
As I have observed earlier, our treatment of qualified immunity under § 1983
has not purported to be faithful to the common-law immunities that existed
when § 1983 was enacted, and that the statute presumably intended to subsume.
See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498, n. 1, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 111 S. Ct. 1934
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). That
is perhaps just as well. The § 1983 that the Court created in 1961 bears scant
resemblance to what Congress enacted almost a century earlier. I refer, of
course, to the holding of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492, 81 S.
Ct. 473 (1961), which converted an 1871 statute covering constitutional
violations committed "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
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On a practical level, persons who stand to be aggrieved by the
Court's Section 1983 remedial jurisprudence have three options. First, a
citizen deprived of his constitutional rights who will be denied
compensation under the existing complex of Supreme Court decisions
could ask the Court to overrule those decisions. However, the force of
stare decisis is greatest in decisions construing legislation, such as the
Court's interpretations of Section 1983.231 Furthermore, the current
Supreme Court is not likely to be a hospitable audience to arguments
seeking to liberalize federal court remedies to victims of governmental
wrongdoing, particularly where the defendants are state and local
actors.232
custom, or usage of any State," Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.SC. § 1983 (emphasis
added), into a statute covering constitutional violations committed without the
authority of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State,
and indeed even constitutional violations committed in stark violation of state
civil or criminal law. See Monroe, U.S. at 183; id., at 224-225
(FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting). As described in detail by the concurring
opinion of Judge Silberman in this case, see 320 U.S. App. D.C. 150, 93 F.3d
813, 829 (1996), Monroe changed a statute that had generated only 21 cases in
the first 50 years of its existence into one that pours into the federal courts tens
of thousands of suits each year, and engages this Court in a losing struggle to
prevent the Constitution from degenerating into a general tort law. (The
present suit, involving the constitutional violation of misdirecting a package, is
a good enough example.) Applying normal common-law rules to the statute
that Monroe created would carry us further and further from what any sane
Congress could have enacted.
See also Stefanie Lindquist, Joseph L. Smith and Frank Cross, The Rhetoric of Restraint
and the Ideology of Activism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 103, 124 (2007) (concluding from
empirical analysis of decisions by individual Justices that "[c]onservative justices, like
liberals, are ideological in their decision-making but temper their ideologies with respect
and deference for certain institutions. Conservatives show deference to state decisions
and those of the executive branch, while not extending this deference to actions of the
national legislature."); Jeffrey Rachlinski, Why Heightened Pleading-Why Now?, 114
PENN ST. L. REv. 1247 (2010) (identifying forces external to precedents that gave rise to
Iqbal Court's sheltering of federal officials from judicial scrutiny).
231. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (noting "considerations of
stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to
change this Court's interpretation of its legislation."). The Court has on at least one
occasion found its earlier interpretation of Section 1983 so at odds with the intent of
Congress to provide a remedy to merit overruling the decision, rather than leave it to
Congress to correct the error. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(overruling the holding of Monroe v. Pape that local governments are not persons under
Section 1983). Of course, in that same case the Court legislated the rejection of vicarious
liability that serves to deny redress to victims of constitutional wrongdoing.
232. Beyond its decision in Iqbal, in the same Term the Roberts Court further
diminished the utility of Section 1983 by overturning the Court's decision in Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). In Saucier, the Court had mandated that courts ruling on
claims of qualified immunity first determine whether, on the applicable record, the
conduct averred by plaintiff violated the Constitution. If plaintiff satisfied the first step,
the court next would decide whether that right was clearly established. In Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009), the Court held the Saucier framework was no longer
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A second option is to ask Congress to override the Supreme Court's
sua sponte constructions of Section 1983. Members of both the House
and Senate have proposed amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
intended to overrule Iqbal and to restore the liberal pleading standard of
Conley v. Gibson.m Congress inarguably has the power to enact
legislation that re-allocates the risk of loss from deprivations of
constitutional rights to ensure compensation to the citizen. In an era of
record deficits, however, the prospect that the federal legislature
voluntarily would subject state and local governments to additional fiscal
obligations is slim to none.
A third option for citizens harmed by government misconduct
requires neither overturning nor legislatively overriding existing
doctrine. For the past twenty-five years, plaintiffs denied protection by
the Supreme Court's narrow construction of rights provided by the
United States Constitution have secured their civil liberty by turning to
the guarantees of state constitutions. The same theoretical, structural and
mandatory. Instead, courts have discretion as to which of the two prongs of the analysis
to examine first.
Under the new approach adopted by Callahan, courts may dispose of Section 1983
damage actions on the ground that the right violated was not clearly established without
first deciding whether the government conduct was unconstitutional. By postponing to
future cases the determination whether a right was violated, the courts extend the window
in which government officials have successive "free bites" at depriving citizens of
constitutional liberty before such rights become clearly established. See John C. Jeffries,
Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, SUP. CT. REv. 4 (forthcoming
2010) (Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2010-04), available at
http://ssrn.com/a bstract-1547237 (arguing that for constitutional rights that cannot be
vindicated other than through civil damage actions, Pearson may "inhibit the
development of constitutional doctrine."); Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, Iqbal and
Procedural Activism 27-28, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1472485 (2008) (noting
Iqbal and Pearson harm civil rights plaintiffs by penalizing both pleadings that are too
general and complaints that are too fact specific). See also Gene R. Nichol, The Roberts
Court and Access to Justice, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1551584 (arguing
Article III standing decisions "aid the powerful and hinder the powerless"); Thomas K.
Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-KENT
L.J. 191 (2010); Spencer, supra note 4, at 200 (arguing Iqbal "reflects .. . an attitude of
hostility and skepticism towards supplicants with alleged grievances against the
government"); Jois, supra, at 5-6 (arguing Iqbal represents conservative judicial activism
to diminish access to civil rights remedies); Victor C. Romero, Interrogating Iqbal:
Intent, Inertia, and a (lack of) Imagination, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1419 (2010) (arguing
Iqbal "signals the Court's reluctance to intervene in matters (even tangentially) related to
national security even if the government's allocation of burdens and benefits perpetuates
societal racial and gender privileges"); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Business as Usual:
Immigration and the National Security Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1489 (2010)
(contending Iqbal perpetuates lack of accountability for selective discrimination against
foreign nationals based on race, religion, ethnicity and political ideology).
233. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009) (sponsored
by Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D.-N.Y.)); Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 504,
111th Cong. 2009 (introduced by Sen. Arlen Specter (D.-Pa.)).
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practical reasons that entitle a state court to interpret the state
constitution to afford more generous rights to its citizenry empower those
courts to escape the shadow of the Court's remedies jurisprudence.
Actions for violation of the state constitution are not founded in Section
1983. Hence, the Court's interpretation of the remedial scheme
prescribed by Section 1983 is not binding on state courts discerning
remedies available under state constitutions, or state statutes enforcing
those constitutions.234
Understanding the Supreme Court's disregard of the acknowledged
limits on its power and role provides an additional argument in favor of
state court departure from the Supreme Court's risk allocation when
seeking remedies for violation of the state constitution. The weight of
stare decisis attached to a decision is diminished where the court acts on
an issue without the advice of the lower courts and counsel.235
Advocates seeking compensation for harms caused by violation of state
constitutions are well advised to recount how the obstacles to relief under
Section 1983 are founded in the Supreme Court's issuance of edicts on
grounds that were neither litigated below nor argued to the Court by the
parties.
234. Plaintiffs' counsel could join a Section 1983 action for violation of the federal
constitution in the state court action. See Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009)
(states may not divest their courts of general jurisdiction from entertaining Section 1983
actions). The state's procedural rules may afford a more generous standard of notice
pleading. Plaintiffs also might consider utilizing presuit discovery available under state
rules of procedure. See Dodson, supra note 4.
235. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 647 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[W]e owe somewhat less
deference to a decision that was rendered without benefit of full airing of all the relevant
considerations. That is the premise of the canon of interpretation that language in a
decision not necessary to a holding may be accorded less weight in subsequent cases.").
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